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I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey Note, analyzing the problems which inhere in the church-state
relation in contemporary America, marks the fourth such study in a series which
began in 1958.' Others in the series were published in the May, 1960,2 and August,
1962,3 issues of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
It is the purpose of these studies to report and to evaluate the relevant judicial
decisions and legislative enactments which have occurred in the two-year period
under study. The complexity of the subject matter precludes a "black letter" law
approach. For that reason a sustained effort is made to report in depth significant
trends against the backdrop of a central commitment to the efficacy of religious
values in a viable legal system. However, the Survey Note is certainly not intended
1 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1955-57), 33 NOTES DAME LAw.
416 (1958).
2 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1958-60), 35 NOTRE DAME LAW.
405 (1960); 35 NoTRz DAME LAW. 537 (1960).
3 Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey (1960-62), 37 NoTRE DAME LAW.
649 (1962).
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to be a definitive and exhaustive analysis of all the church-state problems in the
United States.
To be sure, the broad areas of conflict have remained dearly identified since
they were first set out in our 1958 Note. Previously noted trends often continue,
e.g., the abrogation of the charitable immunity doctrine; however, it is equally
clear that each two-year period seems to include problems deserving special exam-
ination. For example, the case of Torcaso v. Watkins4 presented the writers of the
1962 Survey with the problem of a religious test oath. In our present Survey we
shall examine some of the ramifications of Torcaso in the area of the conscientious
objector exemption to the Universal Military Training and Service Act.5
Sometimes a problem considered by an earlier Note remains static, such as
the area of church gambling and zoning. 6 At other times a problem like Sunday
Closing Laws, discussed in the light of Braunfeld v. Brown' in the 1962 Survey,
will persist even after the Supreme Court speaks. In this issue we return to the
Sabbatarian exception, urged unsuccessfully in Braunfeld, in order to consider
afresh affirmative arguments recently advanced and to evaluate the impact of
Sherbert v. Verners8 -a Supreme Court case strikingly sympathetic to religious
values. Sherbert is significant in two other respects. First, it suggests interesting
possibilities for the free exercise of religion vis-b.-vis welfare legislation enacted for
a concededly valid secular purpose. These possibilities, together with some tentative
predictions about the path of the law, are discussed in this Note. Secondly, it illus-
trates the swiftly changing attitudes of the court when confronted with problems
of religious accommodation. In this regard the court may be reacting in an
understandable fashion to the virulent criticism with which they were confronted
after Engel v. Vitale9 and School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp.Y'
The implications of the School Prayer Cases' constitutional proscription of religious
exercises for public school children are dispassionately examined in this Survey. A
similar attempt at dispassionate analysis is offered concerning the continuing chal-
lenge to religious values presented by obscenity. Since the last Survey, the Supreme
Court has given us the first gloss upon Roth v. United States'l; and some attempt
is made hereafter to place this latest pronouncement concerning obscenity in its
proper legal and moral context. The persistent problem of aid to parochial educa-
tion is re-examined in the light of the School Prayer Cases12 and some suggestions
for solving the present impasse are considered. While these problems largely bristle
with church-state conflict, they also often occasion a discussion of the implications
of ecumenicism. In this regard particular attention is paid hereafter to the possible
effect of the ecumenical movement on church mergers and other sources of inter-
church conflicts.
Realizing that there are inherent limitations in a Survey of this kind, we have
restricted ourselves to reporting and evaluating the relevant judicial decisions and
legislative enactments which have occurred in the two-year period under study.
In order to assist the reader in gaining a broader understanding of these changes,
we have further attempted to illustrate the trends present in the various areas of
the church-state relationship.
4 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
5 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
6 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2 at 424 for a discussion of the Church gam-
bling situation. 1955-57 Church-State Survey, supra note I at 418-20; 1958-59 Church-State
Survey, supra note 2 at 406-12; 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 3 at 655-60 for a
discussion on Church zoning.
7 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
8 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
11 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12 School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.




1. Basic Concepts -Clarification of the Problem
"The policy of the state in matters of religious opinion is that of masterly
inactivity, of hands off, of laissez faire, of fair play and no favors."'8 This spirit
of "laissez faire" is grounded upon the first amendment which establishes the
freedom and independence of churches.' 4 In the area of intra-church affairs the
courts are reluctant to intervene in disputes that involve purely ecclesiastical mat-
ters.' The courts will, however, enter the arena of intra-church conflict when
"property rights"'16 are in question.' 7 From this intervention arises the problem as
to what the courts mean by a property right in contradistinction to purely eccle-
siastical matters over which they will not assume jurisdiction.
Where two factions of a congregation claim title to a given parcel of church
property the jurisdiction of the court over the controversy is generally recognized.'
But there is an area wherein the distinction between purely ecclesiastical matters
and property rights becomes difficult to ascertain. This elusive area is brought
into focus by a recent Massachusetts case 9 in which members of a synagogue
brought suit against the synagogue and its officers to restrain them from introducing
mixed seating within the synagogue in violation of Mosaic Law. The plaintiffs
alleged that the introduction of mixed seating was a violation of their property
rights on the theory that as adhering orthodox members of the congregation they
had a property right in the synagogue as originally organized. The court dismissed
the case saying that, "It is not the province of civil courts to enter the domain
of religious denominations for the purpose of deciding controversies touching matters
exclusively ecclesiastical.1 2
0
It is submitted that in the elusive overlapping area between property rights
and purely ecclesiastical matters the determinative question is whether the court
envisages the case before it as one involving a temporal right that deserves judicial
13 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 21 (1917).
14 See generally, PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM Chapter 5 (1953).
15 In Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29, Justice Miller set forth the federal position as
to interference in intrachurch disputes.
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief,
to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which
does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not in-
fringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and
is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The
right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression
and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the
decision of controverted questions of faith within the associations, and for
the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations
and officers within the general associations, is unquestioned. All who unite
themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would
lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right -to
establish tribunals for the decisions of questions arising among themselves, that
those decisions should be binding in all cases of eccleiiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
16 See ZOLLIANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 301-02 (1933). Some courts have expanded
the term "property" by adding the word "civil."
17 For statements by various state supreme courts as to the criteria that they employ in
determining jurisdiction in this area see, 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 387-89 (1950).
18 E.g., First Independent Missionary Baptist Church of Chosen v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d
337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), for a suit involving majority and minority groups within a
church over their respective rights to real and personal property after the majority had voted
to abandon the church due to a dispute over a mortgage.
19 344 Mass. 755, 183 N.E.2d 492 (1962).
20 Id. at 493.
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protection in order to prevent injustice. In close cases the distinction between
property rights and ecclesiastical matters is not really helpful as these terms become
descriptive rather than determinative of the given result.21 What a given judge
decides is a temporal right to be protected will in close cases be dictated by his
individual sense of justice, which in part is formulated by his interpretation of the
first amendment as to what is "judicial noninterference."
Once the court decides that an intra-church dispute is subject to judicial
determination, the issue arises as to what criteria it should employ in rendering a
decision. In the early English case of Attorney General v. Pearson,22 the foundation
was laid for the adoption by the American courts of the implied trust doctrine.23
Many early American cases accepted this theory.24 In essence, the implied trust
doctrine is that church property is impressed with a trust for the maintenance of
the church's original ecclesiastical structure and religious beliefs. As a result of the
necessity of determining what the "original" beliefs were, the court finds itself in
the position of interpreting religious rules and doctrines. Inherent in the implied
trust doctrine is a violation of the concept of majority rule in congregational
polities. Under this doctrine a majority in a congregational.polity might alter the
beliefs or structure of the congregation and then lose the right to church property
as against a faithful minority.
25
A distinctively American approach to decision-making in intra-church disputes
was proclaimed in 1871 in Watson v. Jones.26 This case proposes three divisions
21 See ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 305 (1933).
22 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Oh. 1817). Id. at 153-54. Lord Eldon said,
[I]f any body of persons mean to create a trust of land, or money, in such
a manner as to render the gift effectual, and to call upon this Court to
administer it according to the intent of the foundation, whether that trust
has religion for its object or not, it is incumbent on them, in the instrument
by which they endeavor to create the trust, to let the Court know enough
of the nature of the trust to execute it; and therefore, where a body of
Protestant Dissenters have established a trust without any precise definition
of the object or mode of worship, I know no means the Court has of ascer-
taining it, except by looking to what has passed, and thereby collecting what
may, by fair inference be presumed to have been the intention of the
founders.
23 For a list of early American decisions applying the implied trust doctrine, see 75 HaRv.
L. REv. 1151-54 (1962). These pages also contain an excellent historical analysis.
24 General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.). In
this case the House of Lords awarded 800 churches £1,000,000 of invested funds and three
universities to a small group of highland congregations having not more than thirty ministers
who were faithful to the original beliefs. The decision could not be practically implemented,
and Parliament reversed the court's decision by statute the following year by the Churches
(Scotland) Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, c.12.
25 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
26 The questions which have come before the civil courts concerning the
rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies, may, so far as we have been
able to examine them, be profitably classified under three general heads,
which of course do not include cases governed by considerations applicable
to a church established and supported by law as the religion of the State.
1. The first of these is when the property which is the subject of contro-
versy has been by deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by which
the property is held, by the express terms of the instrument devoted to the
teaching, support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or
belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation
which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned,
owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body hold-
ing the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organi-
zation in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and
ultimate power of control more or less complete in some judicatory over
the whole membership of that general organization. Id. at 722-23.
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with a different rule of decision applicable to each division.27 Our survey indicates
that state courts have at least formally abandoned the implied trust doctrine.
In the hierarchical polity division, recent decisions reflect the Watson approach
with its deference to the highest ecclesiastical authority.2s When the central body
asserts its right over a subordinate local authority -in regard to property, the courts
recognize the superior body's rights.29 In one recent case3" a newly appointed
pastor sought to enjoin the deposed pastor from interfering with the former's
pastoral work. The court looked to the last ruling of the church governing body
to determine the validity of the new pastor's appointment. But in looking at the
decisions of these hierarchical judicial bodies the courts do hold them to the code
of procedure that is laid down for them by their church law and they will even
look to tradition and custom to ascertain what this procedure is.3'
Although the employment of the Watson approach in the hierarchical sphere
seems in harmony with a judicial attitude of noninterference, in that the courts
leave religious matters to central ecclesiastical authority, this approach is not without
its inherent difliculties. The court must decide whether a given polity is hierarchical
or congregational and it may be called upon to determine whether the hierarchy
has the right to control where that right is challenged.n There may be contests
within the ecclesiastical decision-making body that make it difficult to ascertain
the legitimate source of authority.33
The most significant of these problems is determining whether a polity is con-
gregational or hierarchical. In Hayman v. St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran
Church,34 the court struggled with this difficulty in a suit for declaratory judgment
by a minority faction of a church congregation split by schism to determine which
group has the right to church property. To determine whether this was a hierarchical
or congregational polity, the court looked to the bylaws of the synod with which
the local congregation was affiliated and found that no approval of the synod
was necessary for withdrawal. The court concluded that this evidenced the fact
that the local body was a free and autonomous unit. The character of the con-
gregation, therefore, for which the property is to be held in a "sacred trust," in
accordance with the bylaws of the synod, is to be determined by the majority.3 5
A recent North Carolina case 6 highlighted another difficulty in this area. The
Edgemont Church was an allegedly independent and autonomous church volun-
tarily associated with the Western Conference and other similar church organiza-
tions. A factional dispute occurred within the Edgemont Church and the Western
Conference contended that it had the right to decide which faction would prevail
as to church property. The court left to a final hearing the question whether the
Western Conference had jurisdiction over the local congregation; it made the
observation, however, that a "congregation may be congregational in some respects
27 Id. at 722-23. As to the first category the donor's intent prevails, in the second majority
rule governs, and in the third the determination of the supreme ecclesiastical judicatory is the
rule of decision.
28 Watsonv. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
29 Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Fromim, 367 Mich. 575, 116 N.W.2d 766
(1962).
30 Jones v. Johnson, 353 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
31 See Kupperman v. Congregation Nusach Sfard of the Bronx, 240 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
32 Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of Church of Holy Trinity in City of
Brooklyn v. Melish, 195 Misc. 337, 91 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1949). A recent law review
article described the Melish decision in terms of administrative law principles, Pasztory, The
Melish Litigation: Application of Administrative Law Principles in Resolution of Church Dis-
putes, 17 Bus. LAW 997 (1962).
33 See 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1158-67 (1962).
34 227 Md. 338, 176 A.2d 772 (1962).
35 Id. at 777.
36 Western Conference of Original Freewill Baptists of North Carolina v. Creech, 256
N.C. 128, 123 S.E.2d 619 (1962).
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and connectional in others."37 The decision formally adhered to the Watson case
and that case was cited with approval, so that the quoted statement was not
intended as a qualification of the Watson approach; however, it did acknowledge
one of its problems, to wit, that the hierarchical-congregational dichotomy may be
in many cases quite arbitrary.
The congregational polity as categorized by Watson s has as its criterion for
determining congregational disputes the will of the majority.39 The courts have
attempted to protect majority rule in congregational polities by what may be
termed the "properly called meeting" rule.40 In Padgett v. Verner4 reference
was made to the fact that for majority rule to have efficacy there must be sufficient
notice given to all members of a meeting at which a vote is taken. This case
involved an attempt by a minority to discontinue services and thus to permit
property to revert to the heirs of the grantor. The court held that such an action
at a routine business meeting was not binding on the majority of members despite
the fact that a majority of the members present at the meeting had voted for
such action. This being extraordinary action, the court said it would be incumbent
on the officers in such circumstances to give special notice to all members that
extraordinary measures were under consideration and would be voted on at the
meeting.
State corporation law is in many cases found to have a bearing on church
disputes, especially with regard to the congregational polity, as its members determine
church policy. In most jurisdictions the "church" exists as two separate entities,
one of which is the religious or ecclesiastical entity and the other the business or
corporate entity.42 While the aims differ from other classes of corporations, this
does not result in different legal consequences of incorporation. "They [religious
corporations] are created for the purpose of managing church property, and are
endowed with substantially the same rights, subject to substantially the same liabili-
ties, and governed by substantially the same rules, as are other private corpora-
tions."43 The prescribed powers, rules, and regulations of this corporate entity
vary with the state corporation laws. It is beyond the scope of this Survey to attempt
a description of each state statute. Suffice it to say that most of the cases involved
in this area are decided by interpreting the particular statute involved.44
Two cases that have arisen since the last Survey exemplify the close affinity
between state corporation statutes and the congregational polity. In State ex rel.
37 Id. at 627.
38 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871).
39 At times there may be difficulty in interpreting what the majority did by a particular
action, e.g., First Independent Missionary Baptist Church of Chosen v. McMillan, 153 So. 2d
337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), where the abandonment of the "church" by the majority was
not construed as the abandonment of all church property.
40 See, e.g., Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Holy Trinity Baptist Church of Amityville, 15
App. Div. 2d 816, 225 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1962). Contra, Brown v. Mount Olive Baptist Church,
124 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1963), where a minority church faction was expelled at a meeting that
followed a regular church service. The minority contended that this was a peremptorily called
business meeting with no advance notice as to the special matter to be taken up, no charges, no
hearing, and no opportunity to be heard, the court refused to entertain these contentions on
grounds that they involved procedure and did not involve fundamental principles basic to the
doctrines or beliefs of the church.
41 366 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. Ct. App.); cert. denied, 366 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1963).
42 See generally ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW 38-110 (1917) and ZOLL-
MANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 102-94 (1933).
43 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 132 (1933).
44 E.g., Evans v. Criss, 39 Misc.2d 314, 240 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (corporation
laws prescribed meeting procedure and the notice to be given members of an impending meet-
ing) ; Cf., Straughter v. Holy Temple of Church of God and Christ, 150 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct.
App. 1963) (board of trustees of the church signed a note but not at a formal meeting and the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for his services, holding that the board of trustees though
not legally and regularly elected were "de facto trustees" within the purview of the state corpora-
tion laws).
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Nelson v. Ellis,45 there was an attempt by one faction of a Baptist sect to oust the
other faction by amendments to the charter of the religious corporation. The
court held that amendments to the charter were illegal because they were adopted
at a meeting which excluded eighty-one qualified members and also because they
contravened the nonprofit corporation laws by giving the pastor a life term and
vesting in him all corporate authority in lieu of a board of- trustees. In Veltman
v. DeBoer,48 the plaintiffs contended that they did forfeit membership and thereby
lose their right to notice, pursuant to the articles of incorporation, of the proposed
disposition of real property, by holding services at another location. In Nelson,
then, the corporation laws limit the authority that the majority members may
exercise, while in Veltman the articles of incorporation pursuant to the corporation
laws prescribe notice requirements necessary for a certain mode of activity.
The most significant development in the area of the congregational polity lies
in the continued judicial adherence to the fundamental-change rule.47 By this rule,
where the majority has fundamentally altered the structure or beliefs of the con-
gregation, the minority will prevail over the majority in a dispute over the right
to church property.
48
In Huber v. Thori,49 a local Baptist church was torn by a factional dispute.
The defendant majority faction departed from historical customs and tenets of
their church in voting to withdraw from the National American Baptist Convention
and from other cooperating affiliates. The court held that a denomination of an
autonomous Baptist church could not be changed by a mere majority vote of
members for disaffiliation from the American Baptist Convention. This was viewed
as a fundamental change which violated the tenets, rules, and practices of the
church. "Even an autonomous Baptist Church, like other protestant churches, is
apt to have practices, rules and beliefs which form part of the archives of the
church after ninety yeari of operation." 50
In Holiman v. Dovers,51 the Supreme Court of Arkansas considered for the
first time, and adopted, the fundamental-change doctrine, in a case where a
congregation had become split when a majority faction embraced altered doctrines.
The court took two factors into consideration in reaching a determination: (1) the
intent of the donor when he conveyed the land to the church, and (2) whether
the'beliefs of the majority were at substantial variance with this intent. The dis-
senting judge advocated a disavowal of the fundamental-change rule and warned
that adherence to such a rule necessitates deciding issues related to religious doc-
trine. Further, the dissenting judge advised strict acceptance of the Watson approach
when intra-church disputes arise in, congregational polities, saying, "Heretofore
we have followed the principle of 'majority rule.' This is the only way I would
dispose of all congregational church questions ....
Is the fundamental-change rule consistent with the Watson approach? It
45 151 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1963),.
46 264 Minn. 248, 118 N.W.2d 808 (1962).
47 Twenty-eight states have held that a majority faction will be enjoined from devoting
church property to purposes constituting a fundamental departure from traditional faith, cus-
toms, usages and practices of the church. They are Arkansas, Alabama, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota; Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
48 Whitley City Church of Christ v. Whitley City Christian Church, 373 S.W.2d 423 (Ky.
1963) (former members of defendant church were not entitled to condemnation proceeds from
original church property because the present members had not substantially changed their
religious practices); Philpot v. Minton, 370 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1963) (facts did not demon-
strate a deviation from-the fundamental doctrine of the church by acceptance of a minister
who allegedly was not qualified).
49 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962).
50 Id. at 146.
51 366 S.W.2d 197 (Ark. 1963).
52 Id. at 203.
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may be argued that "in some respect" is a phrase that qualifies the "majority rule"
as set out in Watson.53 If a restrictive meaning is given to this phrase, to wit, that
the majority rule is inapplicable in cases where there has been a fundamental
alteration of church structure or beliefs, then this rule is not inconsistent with the
Watson approach. This interpretation, however, would appear to be alien to the
whole tenor of Mr. Justice Miller's approach in Watson. The theme permeating
his opinion is one of setting forth a set of principles in order to limit the permissible
scope of judicial activity in questions of a religious nature. Except in cases of an
express trust, it attempts to "render to Caesar" by limiting the court's competence
to property rights and leaving religious issues to ecclesiastical authorities. The
fundamental-change doctrine, however, places upon the court the burden of inter-
preting ecclesiastical doctrine.
The phrase "in some respect" is found in a paragraph that denounces the
implied trust doctrine. It is submitted that the fundamental-change rule is a
restatement of this doctrine. The preservation of the status quo is involved and
the recognition of a religious association as a static, unalterable polity is implicit.
The court, as in the implied trust doctrine, finds itself determining what the "orig-
inal" beliefs of the polity were and whether or not existing beliefs are in substantial
conformity therewith. Finally, the concept of majority rule is destroyed by a policy
that favors the minority if they have been faithful to the "original" tenets, beliefs,
and church structure. If, then, the fundamental-change rule is but a restatement
of the implied trust doctrine, it follows that it is inconsistent with the Watson
approach.
The courts have unqualifiedly accepted the Watson approach as to hierarchical
but not as to congregational polities5 4 This difference of approach may be accounted
for on the basis of reliance. It seems unfair for a religious association to hold itself
out as guardian of certain beliefs, with the result that people contribute money and
services, and then abandon these particular beliefs and doctrines even if a majority
desire change. Denominational stability is advanced by employing a rule such as
the fundamental-change. The majority are usually not erudite in the basic religious
doctrines of the denomination and often confuse issues when making determinations.
Also, the "majority" is a fluctuating group, and from changed membership often
flow changed doctrines in contrast to the doctrinal stability of the hierarchical
scheme of permanent ecclesiastical judiciaries 5' All of the above factors are
reasons that militate against the adoption of the majority rule as one without
qualification. Any or all of these factors may be why the courts have adopted the
fundamental-change exception to the Watson approach.
A development which may revolutionize the law in the area of Church-State
relations and more particularly in the intra-church dispute area is the Ecumenical
Movement with its thrust toward Christian unity.5" A noted author has observed
53 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871).
This ruling admits of no inquiry into the legal existing religious opinions
of those who compromise the legal or regular organization; for, if such was
permitted a very small minority, without any officers of the church among
them, might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious
dogmas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed
upon the property when purchased or given the court will not imply one for
the purpose of expelling from its use those who by regular succession and
order constitute the church, because they may have changed in some respect
their views of religious truth. (Emphasis added.)
54 E.g., Huber v. Thorn, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Holiman v. Dovers, 366
S.W.2d 197 (Ark. 1963).
55 Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 419
(1964).
56 Id. at 426.
The ecumenical movement is having an everwidening effect in changing
basic, long-standing notions about the importance of denominational distinc-
tiveness. It is inducing changes in theories as to the nature and role of
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that there is "a presumption in favor of Christian disunity embodied in the law.""7
If the goal of Christian unity is to be attained in this country it will probably be
accomplished by the vehicle of merger. In hierarchical polities there is little difficulty
with the problem of mergers since the courts follow the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal. But in the congregational polity area, merger presents the
problem of minority consent, as the courts recognize minority rights when there
has been a fundamental change in the polity. Whether there is a basic presumption
in our law in favor of Christian disunity may be open to debate but that the courts
have not found a satisfactory answer to the challenge of the Ecumenical Move-
ment in the congregational polity area seems evident. Whether the courts will be
called upon to find a solution to this problem is dependent upon whether or not
this movement is a potent force to be reckoned with or merely a pious hope.
The courts have formally accepted the Watson approach, but not without
exception and difficulty. The law in the area of congregational polities with the
fundamental-change rule appears at best ambiguous in light of the Watson approach.
Whether the Ecumenical Movement will be a crystallizing force in this area is
yet but conjecture. There have been no major changes in the law as to intra-
church disputes since the Kresnick-s ruling, which raised the Watson ruling as to
hierarchical polities to constitutional status and cast doubt upon the constitutional
status of the remaining Watson dicta. Recent cases have, however, helped to
clarify problems. It appears that judicial solutions to these problems will be for
future Surveys to relate.
2. Zoning-A Hiatus
Zoning is the power conferred by a state legislature upon cities or villages to
divide their municipality into districts and to prescribe building qualifications and
regulate land use within these districts. It is based upon the police power inherent
in each state to provide for the health, safety, morals and general welfare of its
citizens. This power takes on a special significance when prescriptions and regula-
tions pursuant to it deal with churches or parochial schools. Previous Church-
State Surveys have developed themes of "A Favorable Treatment," s9 "Toward
Increasing Urban Mobility,"6 0 and "In Search of a Standard."6 Cases involving
the zoning of religious institutions have been few in number since the last Survey
and they reiterate previous Church-State themes. The theme of this consideration
then becomes one of inactivity, a preservation of the status quo ... a hiatus.
Zoning use ordinances as they affect churches have been classified into three
groups: (1) those permitting churches in all residential districts, (2) ordinances
permitting churches only upon a special permit, and (3) ordinances that exclude
churches, often, if not usually, from districts where residential use is itself restricted
to certain types of dwellings.6 2 The majority of jurisdictions follow either (1) or
(2) while a minority adhere to (3).
Three arguments have been advanced for the type of use ordinance that per-
mits churches in all districts. The first of these is founded upon the First Amend-
denominations and probably in notions of religious freedom as profound as
the changes wrought by the labor movement in theories relating to freedom
of contract. Unless the courts are made aware of these changes they are
likely to go on applying to present-day problems rules of law developed to
meet the needs of an older order, without realizing that in so doing they are
casting themselves in a partisan role in a struggle between old and new, in
which the state should really be neutral.
57 Stringfellow, Law, Polity, and Reunion of the Church: The Emerging Conflict between
Law and Theology in Ametica, 20 OHIO ST. L. J. 418 (1959).
58 Kresnick v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960), 1960-62 Church-State
Survey, supra note 3, at 650-56.
59 1955-57 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 418-20.
60 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 406-12.
61 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 655-60.
62 Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5, 9 (1958).
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ment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The contention is
that a zoning ordinance excluding churches may be an interference with the free
exercise of religion.63 This question has never been ruled upon by the United
States Supreme Court. The second argument has applicability when an ordinance
permits other uses even less compatible with residential areas than churches which
it excludes. Such an ordinance has been attacked on the grounds that it involves
discriminatory action violative of equal protection and due process.6 4 The most
commonly employed rationale for this type of use ordinance relates to the nature
of the police power, to wit, to provide for the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of a state's citizens. To exclude a church from a district, it is alleged, is
not a valid exercise of the police power because to do so has no substantial relation
to public health, safety, or the general welfare. Such a restriction is deemed a
deprivation of property without due process of law. One of the foundations of
such a contention is the premise that the very purpose for a church's existence is
the promotion of the general welfare. An exclusionary ordinance would, therefore,
thwart the very raison d'etre of the police power, which is also the general welfare.65
During the period of our Survey there have not been any cases directly involv-
ing this type of use ordinance ruled upon by state supreme courts. Such a situation
seems indicative of the fact that this kind of ordinance has gained general accep-
tance from those people compelled to live under it. The second type of zon-
ing ordinance establishes basic uses that are allowed in a particular zoned
district. Coupled with these established basic uses are usually provisions that
enumerate uses permitted pursuant to the approval of the local zoning board.
Generally, churches are included within these enumerated permitted uses. This
type of zoning ordinance gives to the zoning board discretion in determining
whether or not a particular permit will be issued and the degree of discretion will
depend upon the particular jurisdiction. If the philosophy of a state is that accep-
tance of a church is per se a furtherance of the general welfare, the courts will
scrutinize carefully any determination by a local zoning board that denies a permit.66
In a recent Illinois case,67 a religious institution brought suit for the review of the
action of the board of appeals denying its application for a special use permit
pursuant to the zoning ordinance. The court held that the denial of the special
use permit was arbitrary and capricious, and bore no substantial relation to public
health, safety and welfare. In reaching its decision the court said, "[T]he right of
freedom of religion, and other first amendment freedoms, rise above mere property
rights. They rise 'far above mere public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.',,
The court examined the circumstances involved, weighing the possibility of con-
gested parking and traffic conditions and claims of damage to neighboring com-
mercial establishments against the right of the congregation to use its property for
church purposes. Rather than make a determination as to the allegations of
unconstitutionality, the court based its decision on the abuse of the board's dis-
63 See, Congregation of Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Mo.
1959).
64 North Shore Unitarian Society v. Plandome, 200 Misc. 524, 525 109 N.Y.S.2d 803,
804 (Sup. Ct. 1951). The court said,[T]his ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory in that it excludes churches
and places of public worship although permitting uses including village
and municipal buildings, railroad stations, public schools and club houses
which would entail in an equal or greater degree the harmful or undesirable
results which, defendants argue, may flow from the use of the plaintiff's
property for the erection of a church.
65 E.g., State ex rel. Synod of Lutheran Church v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 38 N.E.2d
515 (1942). See also Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HARv. L. Rlv. 1428, 1429-30 (1957).
66 I RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 19-13, 14 (1960).
67 Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the
City of Chicago, 25 Ill.2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962), quoting from Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
68 Id. at 71, 182 N.E.2d at 725.
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cretion, after scrutinizing closely the factors that the board took into consideration
in reaching its decision.6 9
If a state -does not manifest such strong feelings as to the allowance of churches
in every district, the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the
zoning board's determination is arbitrary and unreasonable will be on the com-
plaining church. In a state of this character there is a presumption in favor of
validity when a zoning board denies a permit leaving wide discretionary power
to the local board.7 0 Questions of constitutional import may arise in regard to
the permit type of zoning use ordinance. A recent California case 1 illustrates
these difficulties. The church petitioned the court for a writ of mandate to compel
the board of supervisors to issue a variance or use permit to build a church in a
residential district. Two churches were already present in the area. The church
contended that a denial of the permit abridged its constitutional right of freedom
of religion and that the ordinance, in not setting out specific standards for the
issuance of an exception, was unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the
provisions of the county zoning ordinance permitting churches in a restricted
residential district only if a use permit was obtained were not an abridgment of
the church's freedom of religion. As to the contention of vagueness, the court
said, 'By its very nature a variance is an exception to the fixed standards of a
basic and specific zoning ordinance. Therefore, the variance provisions need con-
tain no detailed, rigid standards and necessarily must vest a broad discretion in
the planning commission and the appeals board." 72
A minority of jurisdictions allows the exclusion of churches from districts where
residential use is itself restricted to certain types of dwellings.73 According to this
view churches are treated like any other property uses and are judged on their
merits as they fit into the general scheme of comprehensive zoning which emphasizes
the best and most reasonable utilization of the land. This minority approach
differs from others in its interpretation of the "general welfare" concept which is
the end of the police power. The traditional idea of the existence of a church as
per se a means of promotion of the general welfare is replaced with the notion
that the exclusion of churches from a district might be, after weighing all con-
siderations, a furtherance of the general welfare. 74 There have not been any cases
involving this type of ordinance that have reached the highest state courts in the
period covered by this Survey, indicating public satisfaction with, or at least apathy
toward, zoning ordinances as they affect churches.
The fact that a state will not allow the exclusion of churches by the employ-
ment of zoning ordinances does not preclude persons from accomplishing the same
69 74 A.L.R.2d 377-411 (1960) lists various factors which have been considered by courts
in scrutinizing a local board's determination in granting or denying a permit. Among these
factors are the following: (1) traffic conditions; (2) the effect of the church on property
values; (3) the loss of tax revenue; (4) noise and other inconvenience; (5) the size of the
congregation; (6) the validity, applicability, and the effect of, and sufficiency of compliance
with, regulation imposed by zoning ordinances or administrative authorities; (7) sanitary facil-
ities; (8) the setback requirements; (9) provisions as to the size of the building or area of
the lot.
70 Two such jurisdictions appear to be Oregon, see Milwaukde Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses
v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), and Connecticut, see West Hartford Methodist
Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of West Hartford, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640
(1956).
71 Mathews v. Board of Supervisors of County of Stanislaus, 203 Cal. App.2d 800, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 914 (1962).
72 Id. at 916.
73 The two minority jurisdictions are California, Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App.2d 656, 203 P.2d 823
(1949), and Florida, Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. Miami Beach, 82 So.2d 880(Fia. 1955). Wisconsin maintains another minority position that received extensive coverage
m a previous survey. 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 656-58 (1962).
74 See generally, Comment, Zoning for Churches, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 367 (1962); and
Brindel, Zoning Out Religious Institutions, 32 NoTPE DAME LAw. 627 (1957).
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result by the use of restrictive covenants. Restrictive covenants excluding churches
have been universally enforced.7 5 The rationale appears to be that personal interests
in contract rights of this nature are paramount to any public interest in allowing
a church to violate the restrictive covenant in question. An interesting restrictive
covenant case came before the Louisiana Supreme Court in Willis v. New Orleans
East Unit of Jehovah Witnesses, Inc.,7 where the lot owners in a certain district
petitioned the court for an injunction against the building of a church in their
subdivision, basing their request on the existence of restrictive covenants excluding
churches. The church argued that the lot owners had waived their objections to
all churches by signing a waiver authorizing the erection of another church and
church school. The court, however, held that the waiver as to one church was
not an implied waiver as to all churches that wished to locate in the subdivision.
In Shelley v. Kraemer7 7 the Supreme Court refused to enforce restrictive cove-
nants against the sale of property to Negroes. Willis and Shelley are distinguishable.
In Shelley the court was dealing with restrictive covenants that were on their face
discriminatory, to wit, that Negroes were to be excluded. On the other hand, in
Willis there was discrimination between churches. Unlike Shelley, where the cove-
nants were discriminatory on their face, in Willis the covenants were not prima
facie discriminatory. Individual action in the form of a waiver set the stage. The
resemblance to Shelley lies in the fact that the result of judicial enforcement was
that one church was allowed while another was refused entrance into the sub-
division. The state action of enforcing the restrictive covenants can be viewed as
a contributing force coupled with the waiver that results in discrimination. Granted
that this is an extension of Shelley in that the covenants were not as such dis-
criminatory, but such an extension does appear to be within the Shelley spirit
of prohibiting state participation in discrimination. In both of these cases the
courts are dealing with that which the Constitution has made sacrosanct, namely,
the equality of all "men" and of all "religions."7 8 It follows that the Louisiana
court might well have employed the Shelley rule of nonenforcement in order to
prevent discrimination between churches in this district.
A few cases have arisen with regard to zoning parochial schools.
Church schools have been almost generally regarded as occupying the
same status as churches, both by the courts which have granted them exemp-
tion from the restrictions of the zoning ordinance and by those which have
not. It is customary to find the courts citing cases involving churches as au-
thority for the position taken in cases involving church schools, since the
latter are classed as an accessory use of the former.79
There are two theories advanced upon which parochial schools have been
allowed to locate in given districts in spite of zoning restrictions. Firstly, where there
is a public school in the district, it is deemed unreasonable to exclude parochial
schools, since they both teach substantially the same curriculum and fulfill the
same function. Secondly, the exclusion of such a school has no relation to the
purpose of the police power upon which zoning is based. As a result, any ordinance
excluding a parochial school is frequently deemed arbitrary, capricious and
unconstitutional."0
A recent New Jersey cases' exemplifies the traditional approach of the courts
when they review a zoning board's refusal to grant a permit to a parochial school
75 E.g., Hall v. Church of Open Bible, 4 Wis.2d 246, 89 N.W.2d 798 (1958); Bucklew v.
Trustees Bayshore Baptist Church, 64 Fla. 171, 60 So. 2d 182 (1952); Housing Authority of
Gallatin County v. Church of God, 401 Ill. 100, 81 N.E.2d 500 (1948).
76 156 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 1963), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 232 (1963).
77 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
78 See the United States Constitution, the first, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
79 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 18-7 (1960).
80 Id. at ch. 18-20.
81 Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Morris
Plains, 72 N.J. Super. 425, 179 A.2d 45 (1962).
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in a given district wherein a public school is located. The test applied by the court
was "that the special exception criteria of this ordinance could not reasonably be
applied to exclude a public school at this location and under the facts here shown,
we must also hold, under the statute, that denial of the use cannot be justified on
such criteria in relation to an application by this private day school.
8 2
Some courts have had to resort to some adroit reasoning in order to reach
a particular determination and yet stay within the mainstream of parochial school
zoning cases. In St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corp. v. Town of Dariens3
the question arose as to the validity of zoning laws governing the location of paro-
chial schools but which were not applicable to public schools. The court held
that in order to treat the parochial and public schools on the same footing it must
treat them differently. The public schools were under the supervision of the plan-
ning board commission and the legislative body of the municipality. The parochial
schools, however, were not subject to that authority or to any public authority.
The court believed that equality of treatment would result from subjecting paro-
chial schools to supervision of the zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey employed a subtle distinction in St. Cassian's Catholic Church v. Allen s4
in determining the validity of a zoning provision that limited school enrollment in
the parochial schools to one child for every hundred square feet of playground
space without imposing like requirements upon public schools. The lower court
had held that there was not reasonable or legal basis for this restriction imposed
on the parochial school in light of a New Jersey statute that precluded discrimina-
tion in zoning or in planning ordinances.&85 But the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the decision8 6 and in its reasoning elicited a distinction between formal
and substantial discrimination. The Supreme Court grounded its decision on a
showing that the public schools in the district had a hundred square feet of play-
ground space for each child enrolled. As a result, even though the public schools
were not within the purview of this ordinance, the parochial school was not in
fact being discriminated against.87
There have been no major changes in the zoning area with reference to
churches and parochial schools. How long such a period of inactivity, and with
it a preservation of the status quo, is to continue is open to speculation. There
are unsolved problems, especially the constitutional problem of possible interference
with the exercise of religion if a church is excluded from a particular district. The
diversity of approach among the states remains, some prohibiting the exclusion of
churches and others allowing it. As long as the public is satisfied with the particular
approach that their state has adopted, or at least remains apathetic, there is not
apt to be a major development in this area. If, however, there is a demonstration
of public interest, by the bringing of lawsuits, for example, the state legislatures
may be forced to review their enabling acts and the courts their decisions. Until
such a manifestation of concern it would appear that the hiatus will continue.
3. Taxation -Discontent and Defense
While the controversy continues over what are necessary concomitants to our
traditional church-state relationship in America,8 the tax exemption for religious
82 Id. at 432, 179 A.2d at 49.
83 184 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1962).
84 40 N.J. 46, A.2d 667 (1963).
85 77 N.J. Super. 99, 185 A.2d 420 (1962).
86 40 N.J. 46, 190 A.2d 667 (1963).
87 Id. at 51, 190 A.2d 670 (1963):
[t]he record furnishes no fair support for the charge of discrimination.
Since the public schools are maintaining playground areas of at least 100
square feet per child, the plaintiff's claim must fail. Nothing we have said
will . .. bar a later application for relief in the event the then prevailing
circumstance indicates unlawful discrimination.
88 See, Religion in the Public Schools, infra p. 328, test in Schempp decision.
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institutions remains an integral and well-solidified part of that relationship 3 9 Even
the current criticism is primarily aimed at the practice of tax-exempt churches
competing with private businesses, not the fundamental concept of tax exemption
for religious institutions.
According to some writers, there is no definite and identifiable basis for tax
exemption of religious organizations; rather, the practice remains as an unquestioned
carry-over from "pre-separation" days.99 The origin of exemptions can actually
be traced back to ancient times, 91 and today remains firmly rooted in our nation's
tax policies.9 2 However, "the prevalence of church tax exemptions in every Ameri-
can jurisdiction, despite the diversities of historical and cultural experience from
which the nation emerged, strongly suggests that history alone does not provide
an adequate explanation for the phenomenon."93 The basically religious nature
of our people seems to offer the primary explanation for its existence and promises
its continuation.
Although the cases and treatises are replete with discussions as to "strict" or
"broad" interpretation of tax exemption statutes, to attribute the decisional law
solely to such a philosophical adherence would seem incorrect. As pointed out in
the previous Survey,94 what the divergence in the decisional law often signifies is
a difference in the legal materials the state courts have at hand in deciding cases.
95
To attempt to understand the seemingly contradictory case decisions, the variations
in state constitutions and statutes must be considered, along with the disposition
of the courts toward religious tax exemptions. At the present time, fifteen state
constitutions make the tax exemption to religious institutions mandatory and
thereby immune from legislative withdrawal. 9 Another fifteen permit tax exemp-
tions to be granted to religious organizations. 97 The existing statutory provisions,
which are often the determining factor, may be categorized as follows: those
exempting "places of worship,"' ' those exempting "property used for religious
purposes,"99 and a smaller number of statutes allowing exemptions for property
"owned by a religious organization."' 0 For an institution to qualify as tax exempt,
some states require a combination of these while others seemingly require all of
the aforementioned characteristics.
Although the "places of worship" type of statute is the most restricting, a
recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision, St. Paul's Evangelical Luth. Church v.
Board of Tax App.,101 allowed for a somewhat broad interpretation in favor of
tax exemption. Pursuant to the Ohio constitution, the General Assembly enacted
a statute exempting "houses used exclusively for public worship ... and the ground
attached to such buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment
thereof.' 0 2 It was contended by the church that a parish house adjacent to the
main church property came within the broad purview of the statute. The Ohio
89 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); Konvitz, Separation of Church and
State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONT-MP. PROB. 44 (1949).
90 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW § 343 (1933).
91 There were instances of favorable tax treatment of the establlshed clergy in biblical times.
See Genesis 47:26; Ezra 7:24.
92 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 427 (1950).
93 Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption Of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461, 462 (1959).
94 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 3.
95 Supra note 93, at 465.
96 Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia.
97 Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia.
98 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (1961): "The following property shall be exempt
from taxation, to wit: All public property, places of worship or burial...."
99 See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 § 500(2) (Smith-Hurd 1954): "All property exclu-
sively used for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes .
100 See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. 8, § 3: "All church property .
101 114 Ohio App. 330, 182 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
102 OHIO Rzv. CODE § 5709.07 (1954).
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Board of Tax Appeals had, however, refused to exempt from taxation a certain
part of the parish house since it was used by the custodian and his wife as a resi-
dence. Upon review, the court stated that the custodian's presence upon the
extensive church property involved was "reasonably necessary for the protection
and care of the property and also for the purpose of meeting the needs and reason-
able requirements of the members and the public in the use of the church facilities
for public worship . ... 103 Thus it held the custodian's apartment to be both
incidental to and necessary as a part of the building being maintained for the
purposes of public worship. A -broader wording of the statute, i.e., beyond just
an allowance of exemption for "places of public worship," would seem to have
facilitated the court's decision favoring exemption.
Several cases have arisen out of statutes exempting property "used for religious
purposes." In City of Nashville v. State Board of Equalization,0 4 the issue con-
fronting the court was whether realty owned and used by a religious institution
for an automobile parking lot, a cafeteria, and a snack bar for the convenience of
its employees, but in competition with other like tax-paying businesses, was property
"used exclusively" for a religious purpose within the exemption provisions of the
statute. 05 Here the State Board of Equalization had upheld the Sunday School
Board of the Southern Baptist Convention -by allowing the exemptions. The Sunday
School Board had argued that by enhancing the convenience of its employees
through nonprofit activities it was promoting the efficiency of its religious work.
It further contended that these portions of its property were within the statutory
exemption because their use for other purposes was only incidental to their primary
use for religious purposes. This latter contention is based on the premise that the
property of a religious institution may be used for two purposes, one business and
the other religious. Because the business purpose results in benefits to the religious
purpose, the former should be treated as only incidental to the primary religious
objectives. Therefore tax exemption for the entire property would be justified.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, however, rejected the concept of a two-purpose
use of a religious institution's property. They reasoned that the statute exempts
only "property physically used in the work of the institution; and that the act
refers to the direct and immediate use of the property itself and not to any indirect
and consequential benefit to be derived from its use."' 0'8 In refuting the contention
that the enhanced efficiency of the employees in performing their religious work
justified tax exemption, the court said "if the Board may operate the parking lot
and restaurant businesses tax-free, why may it not also operate other businesses
tax-free, such as a housing project, clothing store, automobile repair shop, etc.,
for its employees?"' 07 In the court's eyes this clearly could not be justified. The
court's strict interpretation of the "used for religious purpos&' type statute was
underscored by this recitation:
The policy of tax exemption of religious institutions, established when they
were struggling to get along, has enabled them, during the last quarter of a
century, to acquire large real estate holdings and to accumulate great wealth;
and many of them are engaged in operating various kinds of secular.businesses
tax-free, in competition with other like businesses that are taxed. This de-
velopment creates inequities and endangers both the churches and the state.108
The growing trend of narrowing the coverage of tax-exemption statutes for
religious institutions was also alluded to in Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines
v. Browner 0 9 The Supreme Court of Iowa had to decide if a church-owned house
103 St. Paul's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Board of Tax App., 114 Ohio App. 324, 325,
182 N.E.2d 330, 331 (1955).
104 360 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. 1962).
105 TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(2) (1955).
106 City of Nashville v. State Board of Equalization,' 360 S.W.2d 458, 468 (Tenn. 1962).
107 Ibid.
108 Id. at 469.
109 121 N.W.2d 131 (Ia. 1963).
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used as a residence for the church's teaching minister was exempt from taxation.
Feeling bound by precedent to allow the exemption because of a decision some
eighty-five years ago,110 the court still had this comment: "The current trend
throughout the country as shown by recent decisions is to curb and restrict exemp-
tions such as we have here. Adherence to what is now the majority rule would
deny exemption to the property involved on the ground that a residence is a place
in which to live and as such is not used solely for religious purposes.""' However,
the decision in favor of exemption reflected the majority of the judges' view that
the changing of tax exemption law is for the legislature. Browner seems illustrative
of the importance of statutory language even in light of strong contrary policy.
Several rather interesting cases have arisen under statutes best categorized as
requiring both "ownership by a religious organization" and use "for religious pur-
poses." In a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Sallete v. Michalski,'1 2 a religious order owned and operated the premises involved
as a dwelling for six priests and one lay brother. None of the priests performed
any religious services at the "mission house," but rather they furnished assistance
to nearby parishes as needed. The court held the religious order liable for back-
taxes on the property under its statute's because the dwelling was not used
exclusively for religious purposes. The court felt bound by a particular decision
in which it was held, that this particular "mission house" was being used as a
private residence and did not violate a zoning ordinance limiting the area to
single family dwellings. This classification of it as a private residence precluded
a determination that it was used exclusively for religious purposes and thereby
exempt from taxation.
.1 4
An approach more favorable to tax exemption for religious institutions was
taken in Saint Germain Foundation v. Siskiyou County."5 An Illinois corporation,
organized and operated for religious purposes, sought to recover taxes paid the
California county for the three tax years under protest. The applicable statute
required that to be tax-exempt, property be used exclusively for religious purposes
and be owned and operated by foundations or corporations organized and operated
for religious purposes." 6 The California District Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision that a house which was rented to a tenant, some vacant land,
some cultivated garden and orchard land, and several bookstores operated by
a concessionaire were taxable. The remaining properties were held to be tax-
exempt. They included a snack bar, gift shop, and beauty shop. These latter
facilities, so the court reasoned, were operated not primarily to make money but
rather to serve the convenience of persons assembled for religious purposes. The
court's rationale seems persuasive, but note the conflict between this reasoning and
that of City of Nashville v. State Board of Equalization."' There the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that a cafeteria and a snack bar maintained for the convenience
of the religious institution's employees were not religious activities "but are secular
business enterprises, carried on in competition with other like businesses that pay
taxes to the state, the county, and the city."'"
This distinction is clearly not predicated exclusively on statutory differences.
The courts of California in Saint Germain Foundation"9 are pursuing a policy
110 Trustees of Griswold College v. State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 275 (1877).
111 Supra note 109, at 133.
112 15 Wis.2d 593, 113 N.W.2d 427 (1962).
113 Stat.; Wis. L. 1953 c.402.
114 This situation was remedied in 1955, too late to affect the result in Michalski, by an
amendment which now covers the property. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(4) (1957).
115 212 Cal. App.2d 911, 28 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963).
116 Cal. Rev. & TaxCode § 214(1-6).
117 Supra note 104.
118 City of Nashville v. State Board of Equalization, 360 S.W.2d 458, 469 (Tenn. 1962).
119 Supra note 115.
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determination which is far more favorable to religious organizations than that
followed by the Tennessee courts. Whether one adopts an attitude favoring tax
exemptions for religious institutions or one depriving such institutions of the
exemption privilege, it seems clear that the magnitude of the problem is increas-
ing. 22 Some proponents of religious tax exemption base their views on the "public
burden" or "humanitarian goals" concepts, others on the "public benefit" or
"quid pro quo" rationale discussed in a past Survey.' 2' Some proponents argue
that "as long as the humanitarian policy justifies exemptions to such organizations
as drama schools, women's clubs, labor temples, and temperance societies, exemp-
tions to churches seem at least similarly justifiable."' 22 Such an argument is sub-
ject to criticism. The "public burden" theory analogizes to hospitals and other
eleemosynary institutions which afford a social service otherwise the obligation of
the state.'12 3 More preferable would be a "public benefit" type rationale that reli-
gious institutions are of prime importance in the development of individuals who
will, through enhanced morality, become better suited to contribute socially, eco-
nomically and politically to our individual and community interests. As John
Stuart Mill once stated it to be: "the first element of good government . .. to
promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves."
24
The criticism of the states' policies of tax exemption often is that this practice
places an undue burden upon nonchurch members,'1 25 that these inequalities become
more unjust and oppressive as the tax burden grows,1 26 and that morality should
not be fostered by a discriminatory advantage of tax exemption not afforded private
businesses. 27 The critics include many businessmen who feel that tax exemptions
subsidize church-owned businesses in competition with private enterprise. But some
of the loudest voices being raised against the religious institutions receiving exemp-
tions while engaging in business are those of churchmen. 1" Dr. Eugene Carson
Blake, the former president of the National Council of Churches, has said: "We
must seriously ask ourselves whether Christianity's lofty goals are not severely
compromised by our tax exemptions."'
29
The federal government, although subject to constitutional limitations,"30
also confers benefits upon religious institutions. It utilizes both tax exemptions and
tax deductions in assisting religious organizations. Under section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 "corporations, and any community chest fund, or founda-
tion organized and operated exclusively for religious ... purposes' '1 31 are exempt
from taxation on their income."3 There are also unemployment tax exemptions
for religious personnel"s and for services performed in the employ of tax exempt
religious organizations."84 An excellent example of the special consideration of
religious institutions is the exemption of churches1" 5 from the tax on unrelated
120 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
121 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2.
122 Church And State - Taxation Of Religious Organizations - Benefits Granted by Fed-
eral and State Governments, 5 VILL. L. REV. 255, 268 (1959-60).
123 See generally, PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953) ; Zollmann, Tax Exemp-
tions of American Church Property, 14 MicH. L. REv. 646 (1916); Note, 64 HARV. L. REV.
288 (1950).
124 MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 337 (1952).
125 See Stimson, The Exemption of Church From Taxation, 18 TAxEs 361 (1940).
126 Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines v. Browner, 121 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1963).
127 Should Church Property Be Taxed, TOGETHER, April, 1962, at 28-30.
128 Supra note 120.
129 Supra note 127.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. I "Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of reli-
gion ...."
131 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 (C) (3).
132 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(a).
133 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3121(b) (8) (A).
134 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3121(b) (8) (B).
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business income.13 6 Church groups argue that they need the income from such
business ventures to finance religious activities, but these enterprises are stimulating
further controversy over church-state relations. s7 The deductions afforded by
the federal government often take the form of charitable contributions which reduce
the taxable income for a tax paying entity."3  It seems apparent that were it not
for tax deductibility, religious institutions would never realize the donative revenue
they now receive.
Although the decisions are often explainable in light of the applicable state
statutes, the reasoning utilized expresses a growing trend of criticism of churches
claiming tax exemption while engaging in entrepreneurial ventures. If the criticism
continues it could affect settled doctrines of religious exemption in the future. As
for the federal constitutional question, the Supreme Court may well avoid any
decision on the matter, at least until the clamor abates from the recent school
prayer cases, 3 9 and perhaps permanently. The Court could utilize the lack of a
"justiciable issue" to avoid a decision on the merits. 40 Any changes relating to
federal tax exemptions will likely result from a congressional policy determination
because of this "standing" problem. If such changes were to be made, Congress
would probably strive to eliminate the competitive advantages of the religious
institutions engaged in private businesses. An extensive alteration of our religious
tax exemption practices does not seem imminent or desirable at the present time.
As long as we believe that our nation will be improved through enhanced morality
in our people, then we ought to facilitate our churches' attempts to accomplish this
by rendering them at least indirect assistance through tax exemption, especially
where they are not competing with private businesses.
4. Tort Liability- Toward Uniformity
The doctrine of charitable immunity is no longer the majority view among
the states.14 ' The modern trend has been toward abrogation of the judicially-
created doctrine, but in the process of this change, the law has become a con-
glomeration of those rules that have abolished the doctrine, those that have
qualified it in some way, and those that retain it. Thus, the present state of the
law is one of disagreement among states and confusion within states as agitation
for change increases.24 2 It is not our task to examine the entire field of charitable
immunity but only that area of it that affects religious institutions. The rationales
136 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 511(a)(1).
137 Supra note 120.
138 INT. RV. CODE of 1954, § 170(b).
139 p. 327 infra.
140 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
141 Twenty-six jurisdictions have abolished the charitable immunity doctrine. They are
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey (up to $10,000 by statute), New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. There are twenty-two states that retain the judicially created
doctrine. They are Arkansas, Colorado (not immune when insured), Connecticut, Illinois (not
immune when insured), Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming. Three jurisdictions have not ruled on the charitable immunity doc-
trine. They are New Mexico, South Dakota, and Hawaii.
142 Mr. Justice Rutledge, in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76
App. D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (App. D.C. 1942), commented on the state of the law in
this area as follows:
Paradoxes of principle, fictional assumptions of fact and consequence,
and confused results characterize judicial disposition of these claims. From
full immunity, through varied but inconsistent qualifications to general
responsibility is the gamut of decisions. The cases are earmarks of the law
in flux. They indicate something wrong at the beginning or that something
has become wrong since then. They also show that correction, though in
process, is also incomplete.
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employed by its proponents and opponents, however, are uniformly applicable to
any charitable institution whatever its nature.
Proponents of the charitable immunity doctrine have devised a number of
ingenious theories upon which they rationalize the existence of the doctrine.
According to the trust theory, 14 funds given by a donor to a charity are limited
to uses which accomplish the purposes for which the particular charity was set up.
To employ such funds for payment to a party injured by the tortious conduct of
a charity's agent, or employees is to use charitable funds for a purpose for which
they were not intended and which is, therefore, violative of the trust. It is reasoned
that the employment of these funds for such a purpose would discourage donors
from giving to a nonprofit institution. The respondeat superior theory holds that
since a charitable organization receives no direct benefit from its agents or employees
it should not be liable for their torts.1 " Often this theory is qualified by making
a nonprofit organization liable for negligence in appointing an incompetent servant.
The waiver theory holds that one who accepts the benefits of a charity waives his
right to collect damages for the torts of a charity's servants or agents.145 Occa-
sionally, immunity is defended on the ground that since governmental agencies are
given immunity and these charitable organizations are engaged in quasi-govern-
mental activities this should be a basis for the imputation of immunity to them
as well.148
An attempt has been made to justify the immunity doctrine on public policy
grounds, that it is better that an injured individual bear the loss than the charitable
institution that is engaged in activity that benefits society as a whole. To diminish
the funds of such an institution will correspondingly leave less to be used in aiding
the general public. 47 Finally, it is contended that to abolish the charitable immu-
nity doctrine is a matter of public policy which must be left to the state legislature.'"8
Critics of the charitable immunity doctrine emphasize the changed nature of
charities since the period when the doctrine was established. They contend that
the change in financial position has resulted in a change in the kind of nonprofit
organization with which the courts are dealing and that, therefore, an alteration
in the law as to these organizations is in order. Charitable institutions are no
longer small and in need of judicial protection but are vast enterprises that can
afford to bear the losses which individuals suffer at their hands. The availability
of insurance is also a factor to consider in balancing the equities between the
injured person and the charitable institution whose agents or employees caused
the injury. The charitable organization does not have to pay for every such
injury but has to pay only the fee assessed by the insurance company for coverage.'"
Such innovations as workmen's compensation laws, social security, and the increased
scope of governmental liability evidence a trend toward social consciousness.
Finally, opponents of charitable immunity contend that since this is a judicially
143 This theory was first propounded in Lord Cottenham's famous dictum in The Feoffes of
Herriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
144 Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium or Tucson v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d
458 (1938), rev'd, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Emery
v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921). 145 Wilcox v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hosp., 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938) ; Saint Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine, 195
Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924).
146 Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155(1906).
* 147 Andrews v. Young Man's Christian Ass'n of Des Moines, 126 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186(1939).
148 Richardson v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 191 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. Appl. 1963). For a rebuttal
of the arguments for charitable immunity see PROSsER, LAW OF TORTS 784-88 (2d ed. 1955).
149 Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Missionary
Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
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created doctrine, the courts have power to abolish it.15 Recent cases exemplify
the changing character of the law in this area and the diversity of approach that
exists among the states.
A few recent cases have reaffirmed the charitable immunity doctrine. In an
Indiana case"5 a woman brought suit against a religiously affiliated hospital to
recover for injuries sustained when a marble partition wall fell on her. She con-
tended that a distinction could be made between holding a charitable institution
exempt from liability for the torts resulting from the negligence of its employees
and holding it liable in its capacity as a corporation. In refusing to accept the
distinction, the Supreme Court of Indiana did not attempt to justify the charitable
immunity doctrine by employing any of the commonly used rationales. The para-
mount reason for its holding appears to be a deference to legislative authority,
since the legislature in 1959 refused to abolish immunity as to eleemosynary insti-
tutions. The court seemed to feel that even to qualify the doctrine would be judicial
legislation and a usurpation of authority. It appears that the doctrine of charitable
immunity will remain in Indiana until the legislature decides to abrogate it.
In Makar v. St. Nicholas Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Greek Catholic Church,'52
the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that had enacted the judicially created
doctrine was put in question. The plaintiff contended that the statute, to the
extent that it related to religious institutions and made a gift (of immunity) to a
church organization violated the constitutional prohibition against legislation re-
specting an establishment of religion. He further averred that such legislation was
an interference with the free practice of religion by churchgoers, and that it was
repugnant to the equal protection and due process or privileges and immunities
provisions of the federal and state constitutions. The court rejected the argument
of unconstitutionality as to the immunity statute saying that, "the creation and
granting of charitable immunity is within the province of the Legisature ... "1
Although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically ruled as to the
constitutionality of such statutes, this decision handed down by a state court is
encouragement to those who would advocate the establishment of charitable
immunity by statute.
Although there has been explicit reaffirmation of the charitable immunity
doctrine in a few states, the law has continued to move toward the abrogation
or qualification of the doctrine and the extension of liability. In Widell v. Holy
Trinity Catholic Church, 4 the plaintiff brought suit against the church for injuries
received when he tripped on a kneeler located in the church. The church defended
on the ground that it was a charitable institution and, therefore, immune from
liability, but in a well-reasoned opinion the court rejected the defense and abolished
the doctrine in Wisconsin. Charitable immunity, according to the court, was an
exception to the common law rule of liability for common law negligence. It had
been interwoven with the granting of immunity to governments and public charities,
but these bodies had since lost their immunity in Wisconsin. While the immunity
doctrine was based upon the respondeat superior theory that a master or principal
had to derive some benefit from its agents or employees, the court preferred to look
at the organization's right of control and direction over its agents and employees.
Thus respondeat superior was eliminated as a basis for the existence of immunity
and was instead employed as a basis of liability. For many years in Wisconsin
150 Two recent law review articles set out the problem of charitable immunity and propose
its abrogation. Friedman, Charitable Institutions - A Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Im-
munity from Tort Liability, 24 GA. B.J. 201 (1961) ; Toth, Church Liability for Negligence, 11
CLzV. - MAR. L. REV. 119 (1962), interesting from the point of view that it was written by a
clergyman.
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there had been a gradual chipping away of charitable immunity and the court
felt that it was illogical and inconsistent to hold a religious institution liable for
nuisance, for example, and not for negligence. The defendant church contended
that immunity was necessary so that its good work would not in any way be
hindered. The real question as the court saw it was "whether the benefit to the
many should be at the expense of the innocent sufferer of injuries caused by the
negligence of an agent of the religious institution."' 5 In answer the court said,
When an institution owes a duty of care to another and, as a result of carry-
ing on its activities through agents whether the enterprise or activity involves
financial gain or not and no matter how lofty the purpose or motive, injures
another either directly or through agents the breach of duty ought not be
excused or justified on the grounds of the laudable purpose or the public bene-
fit of the activity causing the injury ... Natural justice finds a legal basis
and expression in the normal uncurtailed operation of respondeat superior.
The disposition of a person to recognize and render to every man as an indi-
vidual his due, so neither may gain by the other's losses is but commutativejustice. Certainly institutions teaching divine justice, the dignity of man and
obligations to his fellowman and of his Creator would not claim on the basis
of their teachings that they ought to be exempt from repairing the injury done
by themselves or their agents to another.'5 6
The court made the new ruling abolishing immunity of religious institutions pros-
pective as of July 1, 1963. Causes of action arising before that date were to be
governed by the old rule but the new rule was to apply to the case at hand. The
court did not appear to be concerned by the fact that such a ruling applied
retroactively to the defendant and this matter-of-course attitude may have been
the result of the fact that the defendant was insured.
In Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n of Louisville,5 7 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals abolished the charitable immunity doctrine. In stating its decision the
court employed rather strong language.
It has not been right, is not now right, nor could it ever be right for the
law to forgive any person or any association of persons for wronging any other
person. * * * Upon applying the simple test of right and wrong we are forced
to the conclusion that the charitable nature of a wrongdoer should create no
exception to the rule of liability.' 58
In Shepphard v. Immanuel Baptist Church, 59 the doctrine set forth in Milliken
was made applicable to churches, so that the demise of charitable immunity in
Kentucky is now complete.
In a recent Kansas case 60 the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against
the church for the death of his son who had tripped over a rock or other obstruc-
tion on a walk along the rear of the church cabin. It was alleged that the boy
fell into an unguarded stairway of the cabin and that death resulted from the
fall. The Supreme Court of Kansas had, in Noel v. Menninger Foundation,'16
abolished charitable immunity as to charitable hospitals. In this case Noel was
broadly construed to include church institutions.
In some of the states that formally adhere to the charitable immunity doctrine,
such adherence has been qualified by exceptions. A charitable institution may be
liable for negligence in choosing its agents. 62 If the religious polity has insurance this
may be construed as a waiver of its right to charitable immunity. 63 The existence
of these exceptions complicates the already diverse approaches that the states take to
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the charitable immunity doctrine. The result is a present state of law that is almost
impossible to assemble into any sort of uniform pattern.
For the first time this Survey can report that a majority of the fifty-one jurisdic-
tions have abolished the charitable immunity doctrine. The trend of the law has been
toward the rejection of this doctrine. Even in states that maintain immunity for these
institutions, exceptions have been introduced. In cases that have reaffirmed the doc-
trine, the commonly employed rationales for the continued existence of the doctrine
are strikingly absent. The foundation for reaffirmation appears to be stare decisis or,
as in Indiana, the belief that this is a matter for legislative determination. Religious
institutions have a vested interest in the survival of the doctrine and as such might be
expected to be among its leading proponents. But among these groups there is a
division of opinion, based upon moral considerations, as to the desirability of contin-
uance of the charitable immunity 'doctrine.1 4 Various religious institutions have rec-
ognized moral responsibility to compensate injured parties by waiving their right
of immunity through the purchase of liability insurance. Thus it can be seen that
the charitable immunity doctrine is not dead and that there is a diversity of approach
and application among the states that adhere to the doctrine, but the movement
toward uniformity through abrogation continues apace.
B. EDUCATION
The "interregnum," discussed in the previous Survey,' 65 has passed. Federal
constitutional limitations have been applied against the state established policies of
religious exercises by public school children. Engel' 66 and Schempp 67 are the law
of the land.
We live in an era of controversy and of change, one in which many of our
older values have been questioned and altered. The Supreme Court, by the very
nature of its function, stands in the midst of this controversy. It must determine far-
reaching questions of policy which often alienate segments of the American polity.
The Court does not, however, decide these questions under a shield of immunity
from criticism. This has remained true of their decisions in the School Prayer Cases.
When the Court decides cases of great importance such as these, there remains the
challenge of reasonably and dispassionately assessing the propriety of the decisions
and determining the extent of their impact on our relationship between church
and state.
In its monumental decisions concerning the role of the state in relation to reli-
gious exercises for public school children, the Supreme Court has decreed a certain
limit of allowable conduct on the part of the state. Prayer in the public schools is
not to be allowed. Thus it appears that parents seeking any religious orientation in
the formal education of their children must now utilize parochial schools. For
many, the finances will not be available to choose parochial education. Some,
because of geographical location, will find no religious schools available. Those
who do choose parochial education, have the necessary finances, and find a religious
school nearby will add to the financial difficulties increasingly plaguing the parochial
schools. The economic problems of parochial schools include a growing scarcity of
space and lack of qualified members of religious orders who have traditionally
taught for little pay. The result has been a drain on parochial school finances.
When the financial difficulties of parochial schools are considered in conjunction
with the constitutional bars to assisting them found in many state constitutions, it
seems apparent that the time is proper for a federal determination of the question.
However, an early federal determination may not be forthcoming in light of the
constitutional uncertainty of aid to parochial education following the School Prayer
Cases.
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1. Religion in the Public Schools - Constitutional Proscription
In Engel, the stage was set by a directive of the Board of Education of Union
Free School District No. 9 of Hyde Park, New York. It provided for saying the
following prayer aloud by each class, in the presence of the teacher, at the beginning
of each school day: "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country." This
prayer was composed by the State Board of Regents of New York, who were vested
with broad powers over the state's public school system. Petitioning the court were
the parents of ten students who were enrolled in the schools of the district and which
group included Jews, Unitarians, members of the Society of Ethical Culture, and
one nonbeliever. They asserted that the use of this official prayer in the public
schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves
and their children, and thus violates the first amendment. The trial court upheld the
power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of
its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the
prayer over his parents' objection.'" This decision was sustained by the New York
Court of Appeals.169
Mr. Justice Black speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States stated
that New York had adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the establishment
clause of the first amendment. The court thought that there was no doubt that the
practice was a religious activity since it was a solemn avowal of divine faith and
supplication for the -blessings of the Almighty. Then the court stated: "[W]e think
that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part
of a religious program carried on by government.M The court then discussed the
historical basis for so holding. Perhaps expecting the controversy that was to follow
the court said: "It is neither sacriligious nor antireligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves
and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance..7  Then the court
specified that the encouragement of our children to recite historical documents or
anthems was beyond the reach of this opinion. 2 Although Justice Douglas con-
curred separately, 7 3 the lone dissenter was Justice Stewart who stated: "I cannot
see how an "official religion' is established by letting those who want to say a prayer
say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children to
join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spir.
itual heritage of the Nation.' 7 4
Those who announced the view that the court meant to ban more than a state
composed prayer were vindicated with the Supreme Court decision in School Dis-
trict of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp.1' 5 Embraced within the court's ruling
were two cases. One was an appeal by the School District of Abington Township
from a lower court order enjoining enforcement of a Pennsylvania statute providing
for Bible reading in the public schools.' 7 6 The students and parents were advised
that the student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he elect to
168 Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
169 Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (C.A. 1961).
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171 Id. at 435.
172 Ibid.
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174 Id. at 445.
175 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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remain, not participate in the exercises. They were adherents of the Unitarian
faith. In the other action, a parent and her son were appealing on the basis that the
Baltimore Superior Court should have compelled the school board to rescind the
rule providing for opening exercises in public schools embracing reading of the
Bible, or recitation of the Lord's Prayer. 7 7 In this Maryland case, the petitioners
were professed atheists who claimed that readings from the Bible placed a premium
on belief as against nonbelief. The rule in question here had been amended to permit
the children to be excused upon request by the parent.
The Supreme Court in both cases held that the laws involved required religious
exercises and that such exercises were being conducted in direct contravention of
the rights of the appellees in the Pennsylvania case and petitioners in the Maryland
case. Again basing the decision on the establishment clause, Justice Clark speaking
for the court said:
As we have indicated, the Establishment Clause has been directly con-
sidered by this Court eight times in the past score of years, and with only one
Justice dissenting on the point, it has consistently held that the clause with-
drew all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof.
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.178
Under the establishment clause, the fact that individual students may absent them-
selves upon parental request would not mitigate the unconstitutionality of the reli-
gious exercises. The court thought the distinction between the free exercise clause
and the establishment clause of the first amendment was apparent-"[a] violation of
the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended.' 79 In Schempp, concurring opinions were written
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg, while Mr. Justice Stewart dissented.
Justice Stewart felt that since there was no coercion of the nonparticipants, this was
not the type of support of religion barred by the establishment clause.'80
With Engel and Schempp, the Supreme Court seems to have disposed finally
of the school prayer question. However, this was not accomplished without criticism
of the methods which they utilized. In relying on pre-Revolutionary history, Justice
Black first attempts to demonstrate the practice of governmentally established prayer
in sixteenth century England as one of the reasons for our early colonists leaving
England. At that time the Book of Common Prayer was utilized to specify the
accepted form and content of prayer and other religious ceremonies.',' He also
refers to the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty by which all religious groups were
placed on an equal footing so far as the state was concerned.' 8 ' In so doing, Justice
Black overlooks several pertinent considerations. Twentieth century America is
not an age when sectarian differences within the Christian faith are regarded as
grounds for persecution, murder, and civil and international war, 8 3 as was the
situation in sixteenth century England. We do not have a union of the state with
a church as the English did then, nor are we confronted by an attempt of the
federal government to establish a church which our founding fathers feared in
eighteenth century America. In fact, as pointed out by Justice Stewart in his
dissent,8 4 Justice Black overlooked the American history of religious commitment
and religion in our public life. It would seem that a better explanation of the
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underlying policy reasons for a decision overturning traditional and important
practice could have been given.
The Court's choice of a basis for rendering the school prayers unconstitutional
was crucial in Engel and Schempp for other reasons as well. It said that the prac-
tices involved constituted an establishment of religion. By so doing, and by avoiding
calling it a restraint on free exercise, the Supreme Court has invoked a lesser
requirement for "standing to sue" in this area. As the court stated in Engel, "The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to
coerce nonobserving individuals or not."' 85 There was no showing of even
indirect coercion in either case, nor was there any proven injury in the plaintiff's
capacity as a taxpayer. Under the court's rationale, the particular plaintiff may
be unimportant. It may even be that any community member may be able to
allege that he has a legitimate interest in the matter. The standards for the
determination of standing are not absolute' 86 and in this area the Court has not
contributed to their ascertainment by avoiding a proper discussion of the problem.
The decision predicated on the establishment clause will further serve to facilitate
its adoption in the local school districts. A decision on the free exercise clause
"would presumably have meant that the prayer programs were constitutionally
unobjectionable unless and until challenged, and, therefore, that school boards
would have been under no discernible legal obligation, as assuredly they now are,
to suspend ongoing prayer programs on their own initiative."'8 'x
Engel and Schempp, particularly the former, have stimulated a rash of public
comment. Many school systems will undoubtedly refuse to comply with what is
now the law of the land until they are targets of court decrees.' Even with the
opinions based on the establishment clause which is less restrictive as to "standing"
requirements, it is quite possible that in many communities there will be no willing
plaintiffs. 189 According to one estimate, the Supreme Court's verdict in these
cases will affect forty-one per cent of the nation's school districts. 90 One Penn-
sylvania school board, after Engel and Schempp, voted to make daily Bible reading
mandatory in its classrooms.' 9' It placed the Bible in the "literary" and "historical"
field and requires each teacher to devote fifteen minutes daily to its reading. If
challenged, the validity of the practice would seem questionable. Another attempt
to mitigate the harshness of the prayer proscription in Engel and Schempp is
requiring a daily period of meditation for public school children. Such a bill was
recently passed by the Maryland General Assembly. If signed by the Governor,
it would also present a constitutional question.
Besides the state activities attempting to circumvent Engel and Schempp, there
have been several lower court decisions which seem to reveal an attempt to limit
their application. In Lawrence v. Buchmueller,92 a number of parents of school
children sought a declaration that the board of education had no legal or consti-
tutional authority to permit the erection or display on school premises or property
of any and all symbols of any deity or semi-deity belonging to any and all religions.
The Board had permitted a small group of taxpayers to erect a creche or Nativity
scene on the school grounds during the Christmas recess when school was not in
session and at no cost to the school district. At issue was whether the etablishment
185 Id. at 430.
186 Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? - The School-Prayer Cases, THE SuP. CT.
REv. 1, 15 (1963).
187 Pollack, Public Prayers In Public Schools, 77 HARv. L. REv. 62, 70 (1963).
188 Life, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 53.
189 Supra note 187, at 62.
190 American Civil Liberties Union Report, 32 (1963).
191 Chicago Daily News, Feb. 18, 1964, p. 6.
192 40 Misc. 2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
clause of the first amendment had been violated. The New York trial court deter-
mined that the resolution of the school board permitting the erection of a creche
under the circumstances there present did not constitute the establishment of reli-
gion.193 Unlike Engel or Schempp, which concerned active involvement by govern-
ment in religious exercises, the present case constitutes, at most, merely a passive
accommodation of religion. The court further added:
To grant the broad relief requested by the plaintiffs... would, in the opinion
of the court, be tantamount to sanctioning judicially a policy of nonrecogni-
tion of God in the public schools resulting in a denial that religion has played
any part in the formulation of the moral standards of the community. In
such circumstances the State's declared purpose of fostering in the children
of the State "moral and intellectual qualities," would be thwarted.' 94
Although a strict interpretation of the test 9s given by the Supreme Court in
Schempp could hold the primary effect of the school board resolution as an
advancement of religion, this would not seem a proper analysis. Rather the New
York court recognized that what was allowed was the opportunity to display one
aspect of the religious traditions of a large body of our people. Children were not
involved. There was no coercion, no cost, no refusal to allow other religions similar
opportunity during the important periods of their religious season. To refuse this
opportunity would require more than a neutrality toward religion, it would be a
preferring of nonreligion over religion.
Sheldon v. Fannin9" also followed Engel and Schempp. It arose in Arizona
where the plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, relying on these cases contended that the
National Anthem contains words of prayer, adoration, and reverence for the Deity,
and that a state's prescription of participation therein amounts to a prohibited
"establishment of religion." The court rejected the contention stating, "The singing
of the National Anthem is not a religious but a patriotic ceremony, intended to
inspire devotion to and love of country. Any religious references therein are
incidental and expressive only of the faith which as a matter of historical fact
has inspired the growth of the nation. . . .The Star Spangled Banner may be
freely sung in the public schools, without fear of having the ceremony characterized
as an 'establishment of religion' which violates the First Amendment." 97 To hold
otherwise would be characterizing a patriotic espousal which serves to engender
love for our nation and a better understanding of our historical traditions, including
our faith in God, as a forbidden form of corporate expression. There is no necessity
for such a denial of our religious history. The Supreme Court does not seem to
have intended this.' 9
If anything, these cases reveal a groping by our lower courts for guidelines
on the Engel and Schempp doctrines. Certainly the impact of these decisions on
other areas of the church-state relationship has not yet been felt. Some may even
question the allowance of a "released time" program as in Zorach v. Clauson99
under the test in Schempp.200 In Zorach, the court relied on the fact that the
religious instruction took place outside the school and that the public school teachers
were not utilized. But could it be said that the legislative purpose was secular and
that the primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion? Both of the ques-
tions require an affirmative answer. This does show the inherent difficulties of
applying a constitutional test in a different factual context. With its language of
withdrawal of legislative power in the field of religious beliefs and expressions, the
traditional state allowance of tax exemption for church property and the federal
193 Ibid.
194 Id. at 88.
195 p. 328, supra, test in Schempp case.
196 221 F. Supp. 766 (D.C. Ariz. 1963).
197 Id. at 774.
198 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, n.21 at 435 (1962).
199 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
200 p. 328, supra, test in Schempp case.
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government's allowance of a deduction for religious donations are brought into
question. So also are the Sunday Closing laws and the state practice of released
time for school children on religious holidays. If released time were not permitted,
this would undoubtedly raise free exercise problems.
The problems inherent in and arising out of Engel and Schempp are merely
indicative of the religiously pluralistic society in which we live. We are basically
a religious people and this is ever manifested in our history, tradition, and in the
beliefs of the great majority of our people. Insofar as Engel and Schempp require
a neutrality in the schools by disallowing religious exercises, they may well serve
to emphasize the need for religious training by parents and the organized churches,
thus not disserving our religious heritage. If, however, their ethos goes beyond
this and promotes a governmental favoring of nonreligion over religion or fosters
an antireligious attitude, then their validity would be questionable.
We in America have always found it difficult to ascertain a common ground
upon which to manifest our religious convictions in our national life. Perhaps some
common ground will be found in respect to the religious manifestations which
believers in a deity will insist remain a part of American life. While our political
order seeks to protect the religious dissenter, we ought not go so far as to impair
our religious traditions or stifle our religious beliefs. These values gave birth to
this nation and nurtured its growth and prosperity. The desire to protect these
religious commitments resulted in the inclusion of religious protections in our
governmental order. The decreeing of secularism or secular humanism as a form
of public orthodoxy does not seem a necessary concomitant of such religious pro-
tections. This would never be in accord with the religious disposition of the great
majority of our people. Accepting Engel and Schempp as prohibiting prayer m
the schools for public school children, this majority may justifiably be concerned
about the future ramifications of their doctrines. It is submitted that Engel and
Schempp need not be controlling in an attempted overturn of state or federal
religious tax exemption, nor in review of federal assistance to parochial education,
nor in attempts to remove from our public life the many manifestations of belief
in God.
2. Aid to Parochial Education -Educational Enigmas
Aid to parochial education remains the crucial problem for our determination
in assessing the proper relationship between church and state on the American
educational scene. Although much of the recent controversy has centered around
aid from the federal government, the states are also confronted with problems
as to the constitutionality of aid to religious education under their respective con-
stitutions. In fact, at the present time any provision for direct state aid to parochial
education would surely be attacked on establishment clause grounds.20 1
At the federal level, the positions of the two major influencing forces involved
were recently delineated. The Roman Catholic Bishops stated that they would
oppose any proposed legislation for federal aid to education that does not include
aid to parochial schools. 20 2 At the same time the Kennedy-Johnson administrations
have opposed such aid to parochial schools on constitutional grounds. Seemingly
as a result of this disagreement, there have been no massive federal aid to educa-
tion bills passed in the interval since the last Survey.203
Moreover, at the state level, there has been relatively little litigation concerning
aid to parochial schools. The litigation that has arisen, however, has been significant
201 Twenty-nine constitutions expressly prohibit such aid. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art.
VII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 30; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 208; PA. CoNST. art. X, § 2.
202 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1961, p. 1. "The bishops of the Catholic Church in the United
States . .. have made it unequivocally clear that they will oppose any proposed legislation for
federal aid to education which does not include provisions for parochial schools." Pfeffer,
Federal Aid to Parochial Schools? No, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 309 (1962).
203 1960-62 Church-State Survey, supra note 3.
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in that it continued the pattern of denying parochial school children the right to
utilize public school transportation. For example, in State v. Nusbaum,20 4 a Wis-
consin statute was amended to provide for transportation of public and nonpublic
school children to the public schools.20 5 Nonpublic school children thus availed
themselves of this opportunity when their schools were nearby the public schools.
Under the statute's provisions, certain pupils attending 500 nonpublic schools would
have been allowed free transportation to and from the nearest public school they
were entitled to attend. The objecting taxpayer contended that the act was
invalid under the Wisconsin constitution, which prohibits the expenditure of any
public funds "for the benefit of religious societies, or theological seminaries." 208 The
court, in holding the statute unconstitutional, felt that the parochial schools which
were now paying part or all of the cost of transportation of their pupils stood to
benefit financially by the operation of the new act. Some would also have gained
through increased enrollments due to the enhanced convenience and lessened cost
of transporting children. The court reasoned it was illogical to say that the fur-
nishing of transportation is not an aid to the institution while the employment of
teachers and the furnishing of books, accommodations, and other facilities are aids.
Although the legislation worded the statute to cover private schools, the court
was not persuaded because under the facts of the case it was the parochial schools
which stood to benefit. Another argument which was urged before the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin was that providing transportation to parochial school pupils
entails no more expenditure than would be required if these pupils were to attend
public schools. In summarily dismissing this contention the court stated "[W]e
are certain that the determination of whether religious schools receive a prohibited
benefit from public funds is not dependent on whether the overall cost to the
public treasury would be less or greater by reason of the operation of such schools
than would be the case if all the pupils thereof were to attend public schools. °2 0 7
In response to a further contention of the Attorney General that the act was
sustainable on the basis that the transportation of parochial school pupils would
promote their health and welfare, the court said: "It could also be argued with
equal plausibility that a direct grant in aid of public funds to parochial schools
promotes the general welfare of the pupils of such schools because it aids in their
education." 20°8 The court could have relied on the reasoning of Bowker v. Baker209
where the California courts upheld an act providing for transportation of parochial
school children, under a similar constitutional provision. There the act was con-
sidered a proper promotion of the welfare of the children. Instead the court relied
on six other decisions under similar constitutional provisions including the recent
case of Matthews v. Clinton,210 all of which had voided acts providing for trans-
portation of parochial school pupils at public expense. 21: Thus it held the amended
act violative of the Wisconsin statute.
In an Oklahoma case, Board of Education for Independent School District
No. 52 v. Antone,212 a taxpayer sought to enjoin the transportation of parochial
school children to and from school each day in the public school buses. He alleged
204 17 Wis.2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962).
205 Stat.; Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 648: "The school boards of all school districts . . .shall
provide transportation only to and from the public school which they are entitled to attend, for
all pupils, attending public and non-public schools ......
206 WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18.
207 State v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1957).
208 Ibid.
209 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946).
210 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961).
211 McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Visser v. Nooksack Valley
School Dist., 33 Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122
P.2d 1002 (1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 588 (1942); Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y.
200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1935).
212 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963).
NOTES
that this constituted a violation of the state constitution.213 The Board of Education
based its appeal on the contention that the practice promoted the "public welfare"
at no additional expense to the public. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in deny-
ing the validity of the practice stated:
The law leaves to every man the right to entertain such religious views as
appeal to his individual conscience, and to provide for the religious instruc-
tion and training of his own children to the extent and in the manner he
deems essential or desirable. When he chooses to seek for them educational
facilities which combine secular and religious instruction, he is faced with the
necessity of assuming the financial burden which that choice entails.214
Then relying on a previous decision,215 the court reasoned that "if the cost
of school busses and the maintenance and operation thereof is in aid of the public
schools, then it would seem to necessarily follow that when pupils of parochial schools
are transported by them such service is in aid of that school. ' 216 Such aid or benefit,
whether direct or indirect, is prohibited by the Oklahoma constitution.
Because of the state constitutional barriers to assistance for parochial schools,
some advocates of religious education have tried to devise compromise plans. One
such interesting plan to avoid the problems of direct aid while retaining the benefits
of parochial education is the "shared time" program now receiving limited trial
in western Pennsylvania, 217 and under consideration in Chicago, Illinois. 21  It
would shift a part of the financial burden now borne by parochial schools to the
general community, thereby lessening the formers' need for increased facilities and
reducing their expenditures for teachers' salaries. Under such a plan, so called
"objective" courses such as mathematics and the natural sciences would be taken
in the public school. Other "value content" courses such as religion and social
studies would be taken in the parochial school. It is contended that since children
have a right to attend the public schools full time, there should be no objection
to this part time plan. It seems somewhat like the "released time" program allowed
in Zorach v. Clauson21 9 in that the religious training is not on public school property.
This type program would lessen the concern of those who feel that the segregation
of children into public and parochial schools is divisive. It might be preferable
to the abandonment of one of the lower levels of parochial education. 2
The fact that state constitutions are often explicitly opposed to any expenditure
of public funds to assist sectarian education should clearly not be determinative
of the federal question. In actuality, the state prohibitions have led many to seek
federal assistance. Although early Catholic opposition was predicated on the belief
that federal aid would mean federal control and perhaps manifestations of anti-
Catholicism, 22' the current increase in education costs is inducing many Catholic
leaders to give up that view. The National Catholic Welfare Conference has now
committed itself to the proposition that federal aid is both necessary and consti-
213 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5: "No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any . . .
sectarian institutions as such."
214 Board of Education for Industrial School District No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913
(1963).
215 Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
588 (1942).
216 Supra note 214, at 913-14.
217 See Cassels, A Way Out of our Parochial-Public School Conflict, Look, Aug. 28, 1962,
p. 54; news article, A.M. Science, P.M. God, Time, Sept. 21, 1962, p. 38.
218 Chicago Daily News, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 1.
219 343 U.S. 306 (1952). There the public schools did no more than accommodate their
schedule to a program of outside religious instruction.
220 Note, Disestablishment In Public Schools, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 578, 594-95 (1962).
221 See generally, Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Education, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRo. 113 (1949).
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tutional. 2z2 However, these proponents of federal assistance have found little
encouragement as concerns direct aid for two principal reasons. First, Administra-
tion opposition seems a bar to the necessary Congressional policy determination.
Secondly, Justice Douglas' opinions in Engel and Schempp foretell deep constitu-
tional trouble for proposals to appropriate federal funds to aid church-related
schools. In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice Douglas stated: "[T]he
Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from conducting
religious exercises. It also forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds in a
way that gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than
it would have by relying on its members alone." 223 Thus he felt that the prayer
practices must be declared unconstitutional for the additional reason that public
funds, though small in amount, are being used to promote a religious exercise.
"The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and this truth
is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds to finance their
religious schools." 224 Financing a church either in its religious or other activities,
in his view, is unconstitutional as an establishment of religion.2 2 5
When the Douglas analysis is combined with the reasoning of the court in
Everson v. Board of Education,226 the constitutional question becomes more acute.
In Everson, Justice Jackson in a well known dictum stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion .... In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state." 227
One opponent of federal aid for parochial schools, Leo Pfeffer,2 28 contendsthat:
[S]hould the campaign to open the federal treasury to church schools succeed,
it will inevitably be followed by similar campaigns aimed at state and munici-
pal treasuries, with the ultimate goal of making public and church schools
equal partners in the American educational system. This represents the most
serious threat to the principle of separation of church and state in the history
of our nation.229
He further argues that if we force any group to pay taxes which go to support
another religious sect, we are using the power of government to coerce individuals
into violating their consciences by paying for the propagation of another faith.230
Aid to parochial education in his opinion would also risk our cherished religious
freedoms through an imposition of federal control over religious instruction. 231
The proponents of direct federal assistance to parochial schools argue that we
cannot afford to ignore the more than 5,000,000 elementary and secondary parochial
students.2 2 They would predicate such assistance on the "public purpose" concept
by pointing to the fact that the parochial school curriculum does comply with the
state requirements. 22  The graduates of parochial education have the same basic
222 National Catholic Welfare Conference, The Constitutionality Of The Inclusion Of
Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid To Education (1961), as reprinted in 50 GE o. LJ. 397
(1961).
223 School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963).
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 330 U.S.1 (1947).
227 Id. at 15-16.
228 General Counsel, American Jewish Congress.
229 Pfeffer, Federal Funds For Parochial Schools? No, 37 NOTRE DAMtE LAw. 309, 310
(1962).
230 Id. at 318.
231 Id. at 319.
232 Hays, The Constitutional Permissibility Of The Participation Of Church-Related Schools
In The Administration's Proposed Program Of Massive Federal Aid To Education, 11 DE PAUL
L. REv. 161 (1962).
233 See Reed, The "Permeation" Issue In Federal Aid To Education, 8 CATHOLIC LAW.
197, 202 (1962).
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aspirations for their future as those of the public schools. They may desire to be
scientists, doctors, or teachers, and through these needed professions to serve their
God, country, and families. The proponents feel it is difficult to understand how
these individuals will fail to keep pace with other graduates in fulfilling the national
need for such trained people in the post-Sputnik era. Federal grants to religious
institutions, 23 4 and to qualified veterans for use at public or parochial schools, 235
supply them wiwth precedent for their contentions. In fact the National Defense
Education Act of 1958 provided for loans to college students on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. 23 6
The lack of success in achieving direct federal aid has led many proponents
of aid to center their attention on indirect assistance through utilization of the tax
mechanism for allowing tax credits23 7 or tax deductions 38 from federal income
tax returns. Although the numerous tax credit proposals have thus far only en-
compassed expenditures toward higher education, the policy could be expanded
to embrace school taxes and secondary school tuitions thus benefitting primary and
secondary schools as well as colleges and universities. Dr. Roger A. Freeman of
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University advocates both a sliding tax credit
schedule for tuition payments up to a maximum of $420, and a 100% tax credit
for donations to institutions of higher learning up to a stated maximum.2 30 Tax
credit proposals have been advocated by representatives of all shades of political
thought. These proposals have been criticized as causing Congress to lose control
of public funds, further cutting into our already eroded tax base, and increasing
the complexity of our federal tax laws. However, either tax credits or the less
desirable tax deduction would engender federal contributions without federal dom-
ination and would utilize the already existent tax mechanism rather than necessi-
tating the creation of a new administrative department for distributing federal
benefits. 240 They would also facilitate a more realistic choice by parents of the
type of education a child should receive. Proponents of the tax credit device,
meritorious though it may be, suffered a setback in the recent defeat of a tax
credit proposal in the Senate finance committee after it had been passed by the
House.241 It will undoubtedly be reoffered and should it receive administration
support it could be enacted.
The past two years have -brought little encouragement to those seeking assistance
for parochial education. The state decisions on transportation of parochial school
children and the Supreme Court decisions in Engel and Schempp seem to have
raised higher the somewhat mystical "wall of separation" between church and
state. In the legal commentary we have seen some exposition of views both favoring
and opposed to federal assistance. The activity of proponents of indirect federal
assistance to education through the use of the tax mechanism, even in light of
the recent committee defeat, has still been the most encouraging development in
the past two years. As important as it is to American parochial education, the
present disposition of Congress, in light of the constitutional uncertainty, is not
conducive to a conclusive answer to the major question of the federal government's
role in assisting parochial education.
234 National Defense Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 421 (1958); National School Lunch Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1958); College Housing Amendments, 12 U.S.C. § 1749 (1958).
235 58 Stat. 284 (1944), as amended, 66 Stat. 663 (1952), as amended, 72 Stat. 117, 38
U.S.C. §§ 1601-56 (1958).
236 Supra note 232, at 175-76.
237 A tax credit is a direct reduction in the computed tax payable to the federal government.
238 A tax reduction is a reduction in the amount of taxable income upon which the tax isbased. It is less desirable since it would yield the greatest benefit to those in the highest brackets
who need it least.
239 The Chicago Tribune, Dec. 1, 1963, p. 28.
240 Note, Federal Tax Incentives For Higher Education, 76 ITxv. L. Rav. 369, 386-87(1962).
241 The Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1964, p. 9.
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III RELIGIOUS VALUES
A. SUNDAY CLOSING - Sabbatarian Question Revisited
In 1961, The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sunday
Closing Laws of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. 4 2 The statutes were
held to be not violative of the establishment clause, nor offensive to the equal
protection or due process clauses.24" The effect of these decisions was to declare
that Sunday Closing Laws were a valid exercise of the state police power. The
court discussed the religious origin of these statutes but was of the opinion that
they had subsequently taken on a valid secular nature which the states could
enforce.
244
The majority of cases which have been decided since then have dealt with
the multitude of other problems still involved with these laws. A prime source
of litigation is challenging the validity of the classifications made by the statutes
and the prohibition of certain activities so classified. These classifications have
been upheld so long as they are in good faith and bear a reasonable and logical
relationship to the end sought-that is, preventing violations in a particularly
susceptible area.2 42 An Illinois court struck down a statute which closed car dealers
on Sunday on the ground that a law could not single out one class of persons
unless that class is substantially different from classes exempted. 246 Likewise, the
question of whether or not a certain activity falls within a given classification is
also a prominent one. 24 7 In Vornado Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,248 several depart-
ment stores were advertising in the Sunday newspapers and maintaining a telephone
order service for the receipt of orders on Sunday. The court held this service was
not in violation of a state statute prohibiting selling, offering to sell, or engaging
in selling on Sunday.
249
Sunday Closing laws are often attacked for vagueness, 250 and one of the
principal victims of this attack is the exception for works of necessity which many
of these statutes contain. In Commonwealth v. Arlan's Department Store of Louis-
ville, 211 this phrase was upheld on the theory that the term was sufficiently under-
standable within the context of the Sunday Closing law. A strange situation arose
with regard to the Missouri statute. State v. Katz Drug Co. 2 52 upheld the validity
242 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961).
243 These cases are fully discussed in the 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at
680-86.
244 Contra, State v. Grimes, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 96, 190 N.E.2d 588 (1963). In this case, thejudge, citing Douglas' dissent, declared Sunday Closing Laws to be unconstitutional because of
their religious effect.
245 State v. Rogers, 180 A.2d 735 (Del. Super. Ct.); Bargain City USA Inc. v. Dilworth,
407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
246 Courtesy Motor Sales v. Ward, 24 Ill. 2d 82, 179 N.E.2d 692 (1962).
247 State v. Gilfether, 89 Ohio L.Abs. 89, 184 N.E.2d 673 (1962) and City of Euclid v.
MacGillis, 117 Ohio App. 281, 179 N.E.2d 131 (1962), both held that a sale of food was not
directly connected with recreation; Commonwealth v. Levy, 197 Pa. Super. 297, 178 A.2d 858
(1962), shoes are included within classification "clothing and wearing apparel"; State v. Her-
wald, 118 Ohio App. 79, 193 N.E.2d 525 (1963), television antenna is not incidental to enter-
tainment.
248 78 N.J. Super. 102, 187 A.2d 620 (1963).
249 The court so held because title to the goods had not passed, nor had the risk of loss, nor
were the goods available for sale on Sunday, since advertisements do not constitute an offer to
sell (id. at 623).
250 G.I. Surplus Stores v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 125 S.E.2d 764 (1962) declared 1961
North Carolina Sunday Closing Law unconstitutional (GEN. STAT. N.C. § 14-346-2).
251 369 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). For examples of activities regarded as works of
necessity see State v. Bunin, 91 Ohio L.Abs. 150, 187 N.E.2d 630 (1963), holding that a drug-
store is a work of necessity but a modem drugstore which sells almost everything could not be
authorized to sell on Sunday any items other than those which could be found in a traditional
drugstore; State v. Applebaum, 90 Ohio L.Abs. 246, 187 N.E.2d 526 (1963), held a car
washing establishment is a work of necessity.
252 352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1961).
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of the phrase, "or other articles of immediate necessity." The Missouri statute had
been adopted in Kansas, and in 1962 the same phrase which was upheld in the
Katz case, was struck down by the Kansas court in State v. Hill.253 However, the
following year the Missouri Supreme Court followed suit and declared the statute
unconstitutionally vague.254 In general, the validity of this exception must be
determined by the context in which it is used within the particular statute.
A provision in the statute which allows communities within the state to vote
as to their voluntary exemption from the coverage of the statute (local option)
has also been upheld.
2 5 5
Another sore spot in this body of law which seems to be festering is that of
enforcement. Persons prosecuted under these laws will often argue the discrimina-
tory enforcement of them. The burden of showing this discriminatory application
of the law is upon the defendant. 5 6 And still, in Moss v. Hornig,257 the court
ruled that even though the statute had only been applied four times since 1940,
this in itself did not show discriminatory enforcement.
In deciding the Bondy case,258 the court severely criticized the existing situa-
tion of which many of us are aware. That the Sunday Closing laws are not uni-
versely enforced is a well known fact. Such a fact leads to a growing disrespect
for the law which is a dangerous situation in a democracy such as ours.
[I]t must be emphasized that there is a "crying and immediate need"
for the enactment of a Sunday Blue Law which will receive uniform enforce-
ment throughout the State. For unless some uniformity and equality in
enforcement is effectuated, the only other solution will be to repeal the law
in its entirety, rather than having it remain on the books, be enforced unequal-
ly, and risk the people losing faith in our American system of juris-
prudence.m2 59
One of the more troublesome problems involved with these Sunday Closing
Laws deals with their effect on merchants who close their shops on a day of the
week other than Sunday in compliance with their own religious beliefs. Is a
closing law which makes no exception for them constitutional? In Braunfeld v.
Brown2 60 the Supreme Court upheld just such a statute. The merchants in that
case were all Orthodox Jews who were required by the tenets of their religion to
close their shops from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday. They all opened
their shops on Sunday and had a substantial Sunday business. Mr. Braunfeld
contended that if he were forced to close his shop on Sunday, he would either have
to change his religion or go out of business. The Court recognized that this statute
would result in a financial hardship being placed upon these merchants. However,
the Court held that "the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with
one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions.."2 6 1 The
statute here was not making unlawful any religious activity or belief but as applied
253 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
254 Harvey v. Priest, 366 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963). In discussing the Katz deci-
sion -the court said, "but the construction we placed on 'or other articles of immediate neces-
sity' returns to haunt and mock, and will continue to do so" (at 328). This decision was
handed down only two months after a three-judge federal court sitting in Missouri had upheld
this same statute, with one judge dissenting. Cardinal Sporting Goods Co. v. Eagleton, 213
F.Supp. 207 (E.D. Mo. 1963). The majority relied on the Katz case, while the dissent favored
the Hill rationale.
255 State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me. 450, 186 A.2d 352 (1962).
256 City of South Euclid v. Bondy, 92 Ohio L.Abs. 108, 192 N.E.2d 139 (1963). See also
People v. Paine Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d 824, 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct. 1963). In
this case the indictment was dismissed when the defendant was able to prove discriminatory
enforcement; People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962),
conviction reversed where the trial court refused to admit evidence as to discriminatory en-
forcement.
257 214 F.Supp. 324 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963).
258 City of South Euclid v. Bondy, 92 Ohio L.Abs. 108, 192 N.E.2d 139 (1963).
259 Id. at 144.
260 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
261 Id. at 603.
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to these merchants it "operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive." 262 The Court discussed several situations in which the state
could make laws which burdened some religions, but which were valid laws because
they served a legitimate state purpose.
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or
all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general
law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the
State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on reli-
gious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which
do not impose such a burden. 263
The merchants argued in favor of an exception being carved out to make
provision for people like themselves. With regard to this exception Chief Justice
Warren in the majority opinion said, "[A] number of States provide such an excep-
tion, and this may well be the wiser solution to the problem. But our concern is
not with the wisdom of legislation, but with its constitutional limitation." 264 Justice
Frankfurter was also of the opinion that no matter how preferable one might feel
such an exception to be, there was nothing in the Constitution which compelled such
an exception.
26 5
Thus the Supreme Court has decided that even though a man may be driven
out of business by his religious practice of observing a day other than Sunday, the
state may still impose this closing law so long as it serves a substantial secular state
purpose. The harshness of this decision is immediately evident and it is questionable
as to how long the Supreme Court will allow such a doctrine to exist. Admitting
the constitutionality of the closing laws, ought not an exception be carved out for
the benefit of such people who observe another day? Commonwealth v. Arlan's
Department Store of Louisville266 upheld this exception because it does not affirma-
tively prefer any religion nor amount to an establishment of one, but rather seeks
to avoid penalizing economically someone who observes another day of the week.
In the recent Sherbert case2 67 the Braunfeld decision was commented upon. In
Sherbert the Court ordered the state to carve out an exception for persons who
observed a day other than Sunday in connection with unemployment benefit pay-
ments. The majority opinion cited Braunfeld and said in that case a stronger state
interest was being served (uniform day of rest) and that there was also less direct
burden upon the appellants in that case. Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion
felt that this decision was inconsistent with that in Braunfeld. Mr. Braunfeld was
being forced to go out of business while the woman in Sherbert was only losing 22
weeks of unemployment checks. Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion felt that
this decision overruled the decision in Braunfeld. The court went to some lengths
to distinguish this case from Braunfeld, and relied heavily on the theory that the
state in Braunfeld had no other way of accomplishing the desired state purpose.
However, it seems obvious that the spirit exhibited in Sherbert is a much more
sympathetic one than that evinced in Braunfeld, and it may well be that if the
question as presented in Braunfeld comes before the court again, it may be decided
in a different manner.
262 Id. at 605.
263 Id. at 607.
264 Id. at 608.
265 In discussing the exception both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter consid-
ered some of the arguments against it, for example: the possible competitive advantage to
those enjoying the exception by allowing them to remain open on Sunday when others were
closed, the added difficulty of enforcing the law, the problem of inquiring into the religion
of people, and the disturbing influence of stores that are open on Sunday upon the general
atmosphere of rest and tranquility.
266 Commonwealth v. Arlan's Department Store of Louisville, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1962).
267 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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B. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
1. Separation and Divorce Problems -Religion Ignored
a. Divorce. When the problem of the church-state relationship rears its head in
the divorce courts, the approach to it has been rather consistent. The general rule
is that courts will not grant a divorce based on strictly religious grounds. There
must be evidence of some "overt acts of cruel, harsh, or unkind treatment" 268
Mere difference of religious beliefs will not support a divorce decree.2 69
In Frantzen v. Frantzen2 70 the husband sued his wife for a divorce and custody
of their two children on the grounds that his wife had espoused the Jehovah's
Witnesses religion, the tenets of which prohibit such things as swearing allegiance
to any country, serving in any armed forces, and granting permission for blood
transfusions. As a result of his concern for the family relationship and the welfare
of the children, the husband alleged that he had suffered loss of sleep and appetite,
and serious impairment of his health. In denying the husband's petition the court
held "that differences of the spouses in religious faith, teaching, and practice
are not grounds for a divorce."271 The court sought overt acts of cruelty and
found that his "suffering is entirely mental and emotional brought about by
a difference of religious faith and belief."272
A divorce was granted, however, in a case272 where the wife became obsessed
with a religious zeal. She spent large amounts of time at church services throughout
the week. Finally her husband demanded that she choose between the religion
and the home. Saying that she was going to do the work of the Lord, the wife
left the house. The court ruled this was desertion and granted the husband's petition
for divorce.2 74
The attitude of the courts has been not to treat the religious grounds inde-
pendently, but rather to search for some other grounds such as cruelty or desertion
upon which to justify the divorce. When the religious issue touches upon such legal
grounds as these, then it is given effect, but only in light of these legal concepts.
b. Child Custody. The question of custody of children may arise as a result of
an adoption or a divorce proceeding. When it does, the overriding influence upon
the court's decision is an attempt to do that which will be for the best interests
and welfare of the child. Religious education and training are also subject to this
philosophy.
In adoption proceedings "matching the religion of the child and the adoptive
parents remains relatively strong policy," 27 5 but even this may be tempered by the
rule as to the best interests of the child.
Where the question of custody arises as a result of a divorce proceeding, how-
ever, the religious point is generally not so important. Here, again, the courts
fall back on the best-interests doctrine. In a New York case, Miles v. Liebolt,28
a man sought to force his former wife to bring their children up in his religion,
according to their agreement. The wife had subsequently remarried, changed her
religion to that of her new husband, and was rearing the children in that faith.
In refusing to so order, the court viewed the present situation in which they were
268 Frantzen v. Frantzen, 349 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
269 See generally 2 JOURNAL OF FAmny LAw 61 (1962).
270 349 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
271 Id. at 767.
272 Ibid.
273 Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 211, 176 A.2d 229 (1961).
274 See also Bench v. Bench, 199 Pa. Super. 405, 185 A.2d 664 (1962). The husband drove
his wife from the house with his constant attacks upon her religion. He offered to reconcile if
she would consent to joining his religion and renouncing her own. In denying his petition for
divorce the court held that the wife's actions did not constitute desertion since the husband had
consented to it and his offer of reconciliation was not in good faith.
275 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 694.
276 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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living, as the picture "of a warm happy family life which would be disrupted
by the exercise of a compulsion that these children be distinguished from the others
with whom they reside in the manner of their religious upbringing. 27 7 The court
was of the opinion that to so distinguish the children from the rest of the household
would not be in their best interests.
In Stern v. Stern27 this conflict of religion was again presented. The divorced
parents had agreed in a court order that, while the mother was to have custody,
the father could arrange for the schooling of their son in a Jewish Sunday School.
The mother, meanwhile, had enrolled the boy in a Lutheran school and wanted
also to enroll him in a Protestant Sunday School. The court ordered the mother
to place the boy in the public school system and also to permit his being enrolled
in a Jewish Sunday School. On appeal, the lower court's order was upheld because
it would not be in the best interests of the child to attend the schools of two different
faiths.
These two cases serve to illustrate the courts' determination to seek the child's
best interests. In both cases the parents' agreement had been incorporated into a
court order. In Stern the court order was enforced. There the mother and child
were living alone. But in Miles, the order was not enforced because the court felt
it would disrupt the harmonious surroundings in which the children were being
raised.
A Missouri court2 79 speaking on the matter of the children's religious training
after a divorce said:
Ordinarily it is for the one who has the general custody of very young
children, and, hence, the basic burden and responsibility of rearing them to
be fine men and women who, subject always to the paramount general consid-
eration of the children's welfare, has the privilege of deciding what church
the young children should attend until they are mature enough to decide for
themselves.28 0
The religious issue is also present in situations where the problem is not so
much a conflict of religions but is rather one of radicalism of the religion. In a
recent Maryland case 28 ' the father sought to remove custody from his former wife
after she became a Jehovah's Witness. One of the children had become dangerously
ill and she had refused permission for a blood transfusion.2 2 The court refused
the petition for change of custody, being of the opinion that the best interests of
the children dictated leaving them in maternal care." However, the mother's
custody was restricted. While she had freedom to believe what she wanted, she
could not interfere with the welfare of her children because of these beliefs. The
court suggested amending the lower court's order denying the petition in such a
manner as to make unnecessary the mother's permission for a blood transfusion.
"Where a child's right to live and his parents' religious belief collide, the former
is paramount, and the religious doctrine must give way."2' 4
The religious issue, then, is a very real one with which the courts must deal
in these custody proceedings; but it is not the primary determining factor in the
courts' decisions. The courts are seeking to piece together lives already shattered
in one manner or another and certainly all best efforts ought be made to make
this new start a good start. The religious issue ought not be read out entirely but
277 Id. at 344.
278 40 Ill. App. 2d 374, 188 N.E.2d 97 (1963).
279 Hirsch v. Hirsch, 366 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. App. 1963).
280 Id. at 490.
281 Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 190 A.2d 621 (1963).
282 The hospital managed to get in touch with the child's father, who then gave permission
for the blood transfusion which was credited with saving the child's life.
283 See also Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190, 367 P.2d 230 (1961) in which the court held that
the fact of the mother's being a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses did not justify a change of
custody to the father.
284 In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. 1962).
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should be rationally considered in the light of the best interests and welfare of
the child.
c. Agreements Concerning Religious Training. The general rule on ante-nuptial
agreements regarding the religious upbringing of children is that they are unen-
forceable. 2s 5 However, cases to the contrary can be pointed out.28 6 In Wood v.
Wood287 the court refused to enforce the agreement due to the impossibility of
enforcement and the general reluctance of courts to engage in ecclesiastical matters.
A contrary theory would encourage enforcement under a simple contract.
While Williston's 1938 edition states that such agreements are usually enforceable,
the 1963 supplement cites cases to the contrary. 2ss
Many times these agreements will be incorporated into the divorce or separation
decree. However, even here they are not guaranteed enforcement, for the over-
riding influence of the child's best interests once again comes into play.
We have already seen two cases289 in which agreements were incorporated
into the divorce decree. In one the agreement was enforced,2 0 while in the other,
enforcement was denied. 29' The theory of the courts once again was looking
after the welfare of the child.
Another recent New York case, Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,292 held a mother
in contempt of court when she violated the agreement incorporated in the divorce
decree. It provided that the father could arrange for the religious training of the
child and the mother was not to interfere with such training. The mother had
remarried, to a member of the Christian Scientist religion, and she was taking
the child to church services of this faith. The judge concluded that "she has con-
temptuously violated the agreement and the decree of this court."
292
In Miles v. Liebolt,29 4 the court refused to interfere with the "happy family
situation" in which there was a unanimity of religion even though the mother's
action was in violation of the agreement according to the divorce decree. But in
Gluckstern, the court found such conduct to be contemptuous.
The status of the law regarding these agreements regarding the religious edu-
cation of children seems to remain much the same now as it was in the periods
covered by previous Surveys. Ante-nuptial agreements are generally not enforceable.
When these agreements are incorporated into divorce and separation decrees they
acquire the status and dignity of court orders. They are not then lightly to be
disregarded. However, where the general welfare and best interests of the child
seem to dictate a decision to the contrary, the courts will set these agreements aside.
The argument for the enforcement of these ante-nuptial agreements based on
a contract theory seems to be of some value. Marriage is a valid consideration for
a contract.2 95 Frequently, a person will enter into marriage in reliance upon these
agreements. However, two states have held that to enforce such a contract would
be in violation of their state constitutions. 296
285 Wood v. Wood, 168 A.2d 102 (Del. Ch. 1961).
286 MARTIN, Enforceability of Ante-Nuptial Promises to Raise Children in a Particular
Religion, 7 THE CATHOLIC LAWYER 50 (1961).
287 Wood v. Wood, 168 A.2d 102 (Del. Ch. 1961).
288 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1744 A (note 3) (1938 ed., Supp. 1963).
289 Miles v. Liebolt, 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Stern v. Stem, 40 Ill. App. 2d 374,
188 N.E.2d 97 (1963).
290 Stem v. Stem, supra note 289.
291 Miles v. Liebolt, 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
292 31 Misc. 2d 58, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
293 Id. at 624.
294 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
295 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 110 (rev. ed. 1957).
296 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 274, 132 A.2d. 420 (Super. Ct. 1957);
Hackett v. Hackett, 78 Ohio L.Abs. 485, 150 N.E.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1958).
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2. ANTIMISCEGENATION- Abolishing Anachronisms
The status of the antimiscegenation statutes is generally unchanged since the
date of the last Survey. They are still seen as statutes which are upheld in state
court decisions. However, there has been some activity in the state legislatures.
Of the twenty-four state statutes cited in the last Survey,297 four states have repealed
these antimiscegenation statutes.298 This may well indicate a substantial trend of
the state legislatures to settle this problem without its having to be done by the
courts.
While there have been no cases directly involving one of these miscegenation
statutes, there has been one case of a somewhat analogous character.2 99 Florida
has a statute which prohibits fornication in general. However, it also has a special
statute which imposes a more severe punishment when the fornication is between
members of different races. On appeal the convictions in this case were affirmed
and the statute was upheld. The court relied upon the 1882 Supreme Court Case
of Pace v. Alabama300 which upheld just such a statute. The court said that if the
law was to be changed, that was for the legislature or for another court. That may
well be the case, for the appeal has been placed on the Supreme Court docket.301
A decision here might help to speed the demise of these antimiscegenation statutes.
The argument in favor of these statutes that it is a valid exercise of state police
powers to prevent the mingling of the races would not seem too valid in view of
the Supreme Court's recent trend toward avoiding such regulations.30 2
3. BIRTH CONTROL - Controversy Persists
a. Artificial Insemination. The law in the area of artificial insemination is, to a
large degree, in a tumult. It is an area in which the law is still trying to find itself
and is beset on all sides with legal, moral, and social considerations. Some of the
legal problems presented are: does the act of artificially inseminating the mother
constitute adultery? If it is with the husband's consent? If it is without the hus-
band's consent? Is the child so conceived legitimate? If it is with the husband's
consent? If it is without the husband's consent? Should the practice of artificial
insemination be regulated by legislation? The morality of the practice is criticized
by the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Church. But a hue and cry is
raised to consider the married couples who cannot on their own have children.
When a marriage is deprived of a child it seems not to be attaining a major
purpose, and is not truly fulfilled.
The two methods of artificial insemination are, Artificial Insemination Hus-
band (A.I.H.) and Artificial Insemination Donor (A.I.D.). In the former the
semen of the husband is used, whereas in the latter the semen of a third party
donor is used to effectuate the insemination. It is in this area of A.I.D. that the
legal problems are involved.
A recent case on the subject has failed to shed much light on the situation. In
Gursky v. Gursky,30 the court ruled that a child conceived through A.I.D., even
though with the consent of the husband, was an illegitimate child. In that case
the husband of the mother had agreed in writing to the insemination of his wife.
The court dismissed as dictum an earlier New York case.304 which held that where
the insemination had taken place with the consent of the husband, he had semi-
297 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 697 n.396.
298 Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah have recently revoked their statutes.
299 McLaughlin v. State, 153 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1963).
300 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
301 McLaughlin v. Florida, appeal docketed, 32 U.S.L. Week 3168 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1963)
(No. 585).
302 For a discussion of the antimiscegenation laws in light of some recent Supreme Court
decisions see WALToiq, The Present Status of Miscegenation Statutes, 4 WILLIAM AND MARY
L. RFv. 28 (1963).
303 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
304 Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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adopted the child, and therefore the child became legitimate. Instead, the decision
was based upon the Illinois case of Dornboss v. Dornboss,8° 5 where A.I.D. was held
to result in an illegitimate child, whether done with or without the husband's
consent. In Gursky, the court was of the opinion that legislative action would be
required to change the historical concept of illegitimacy. However, the court held
that the husband was not entirely free of obligation. His actions and declarations
regarding the A.I.D. implied a promise on his part to furnish support for the child.
The law in this area, as has been stated, is still seeking to find itself. Whether
or not this will be accomplished by legislation is still an open question. Judging
from the amount of litigation on the problem, it is not now a critical one, although
the scarcity of cases seems to add to the confusion of the law in this area. As was
suggested in the last Survey, the wisest course from a legal point of view "may
well be abstention from positive legislation, with the exception of the imposition
of stringent control on the medical and -biological factors involved in order to prevent
such dangers as incestuous impregnation.3 0 6
b. Contraception. The question of the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting
the sale of contraceptives has been raised by two New Jersey cases. In the first
case, cited in a previous Survey, 0 7 the state statute308 was declared unconstitutional
for vagueness. The attack in that case was aimed at the phrase "without just
cause." In 1963, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Sanitary Vendors
Inc. v. Byrne,s° 9 criticized this earlier decision in a lower court. In the Sanitary
Vendors case the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to declare the state
statutes void for vagueness. The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the auto-
matic vending machine business, and had installed several of its machines through-
out the state. The machines deliver a package of prophylactics when the proper
coinage is deposited in the machine. Throughout the state many of the machines
had been confiscated or arrest had been threatened by law enforcement officers on
the state, county, and local level if the machines were not removed. The court
refused to grant the plaintiff's petition and upheld the statute as constitutional.
It stated that when this statute was enacted, the legislature did so with an under-
standing of the federal cases311 which had interpreted the federal law (18 U.S.C.
§ 1461) against the mailing of contraceptive devices. The rationale of these cases
was that the statute was aimed at preventing the illegal use of contraceptives, and
not their proper medical use. The earlier New Jersey case had stated that personal
social, economic and religious beliefs of the couple might determine just cause.
However, the court in Sanitary Vendors dismissed these contentions with a view
that the legislature, based on their knowledge of the federal decisions, never intended
any such result. Commenting on the federal decisions the court said, "Whose
decisions spoke not in terms of personal morality but in terms of lawfulness and
legality."S12 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled this a nonmarginal case in
which the indiscriminate sale of contraceptives by a vending machine could not
be with just cause. At the same time the court warned that when presented with
a marginal case in which "judicial definition is sought for purposes of retroactive
305 No. 54-S-14981 Super. Ct. Cook Cty. (1954).
306 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 699.
307 State v. Kinnel Building Drug Store, 56 N.J. Super. 37, 151 A.2d 430 (1959).
308 "Any person who, without just cause, utters or exposes to the view of an-
other, or possesses with intent to utter or expose... or to sell the same, any
instrument, medicine or other thing, designed or purporting to be designed
for the prevention of conception or the procuring of abortion . . . is a dis-
orderly person." N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 170-76 (1953).
309 40 N.J. 157, 190 A.2d 876 (1963).
310 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 170-76 (1953), supra note 308.
311 For a discussion of these cases see 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 700.
312 Sanitary Vendors Inc. v. Byrne, 40 N.J. 157, 190 A.2d 876, 880 (1963).
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application ' 3 1 3 it might have more trouble in interpreting the general language of
the statute.
A recent Arizona case, Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 14 dealt
with the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting the advertising of any methods
of procuring abortions or preventing conception.3 15 The plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment to declare the state statute unconstitutional. The court rejected this
attack holding that the statute was not a prior restraint, nor was it a violation of
due process if some substantial state interest necessitated his restriction on freedom
of speech.
In our estimation the statute could reasonably protect both the morals
and the health of the community inasmuch as stimulation of sales of contra-
ceptives might lead to greater sexual activity among unmarried persons.
Whether the statute was directed toward discouraging illicit sex experience
among young people, for moral reasons, or because of the venereal disease
problem, we consider the public interest served by the statute substantial
compared with the private interest in free speech through advertising which
is restricted by the statute.316
As the law stands now, states have the power to regulate the sale of contracep-
tive devices. There is pressure against these statutes and criticism of them and a
final determination on their constitutionality may have to wait until the Supreme
Court is presented with a case of sufficient "immediacy." In the meantime the
state statutes will continue to serve this public interest of morality or public health.
C. OBSCENITY-New Directions.
1. Introduction: Self-Help Reconsidered.
To many religious institutions and organizations the problem of obscenity
continues to be one of the more grave threats to the moral fabric of American life.
The state, however, has been even more concerned about dangerous conduct than
about immoral thoughts. Thus the unusual degree of activity of religious organi-
zations in this field, which we have previously noticed, 317 is in part due to the
historic reluctance of the state to act precipitously in an area in which the Consti-
tution counsels, if not commands, restraint.
3 1 8
The landmark case of Roth v. United States31 9 announced that "[Olbscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press"3 20 and went on
to enunciate the now famous legal test for obscenity of "[W]hether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'32' Only recently we ob-
served in these pages that Roth marked the end of the great conflict between church
and state over what is or is not obscene.3 2 2 It now appears that that judgment
may have been premature.
Four per curiam decisions of the Supreme Court following Roth suggested
the narrow limits within which actionable obscenity would be confined. 323 The
new direction taken by the Court was made explicit in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day32 4 in which Justice Harlan, who had objected to the sweeping language of
Justice Brennan in Roth, enunciated a new requirement for the legal obscenity test.
313 Id. at 881.
314 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719 (1962).
315 ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-213 (1956).
316 Planned Parenthood Com. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719, 727 (1962).
317 1958-59 Church-State Survey, supra note 2, at 546.
318 1955-57 Church-State Survey, supra note 1, at 436-52.
319 354 U.S, 476 (1957).
320 Id. at 485.
321 Id. at 489.
322 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 693.
323 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S.
371 (1958) ; Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355
U.S. 35 (1957).
324 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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Not only must there be an appeal to prurient interest, but the material must also
be "patently offensive."325 This considerably narrows the scope of the definition.
It may fairly be anticipated that this case and others recently decided
3 26
will induce redoubled efforts to self-help. Unfortunately, some of these efforts
will tend to degenerate into the more crude forms of undiscriminating coercion
as the letter-writing campaign replaces the lawyer's complaint, as the boycott
supplants the reasoning of the brief, as the mysterious blacklist usurps the judicial
determination 27
It is to be expected that advocates of governmental censorship will eschew
the more primitive techniques of self-help, which so often alienate those sympathetic
to the religious values at stake,' z8 and will seek to demonstrate the rational neces-
sity for broader governmental action. The fact that available empirical data is
insufficient to establish a causal relationship between obscenity and antisocial
behavior should prompt a greater effort to probe the psychological and physiological
dynamics of viewing obscenity. 29 However, courts should not lose sight of the
fact that the universal existence of obscenity laws ultimately needs no greater justi-
fication than common sense.3 3
0
2. Refining the definition: Shifting Standards.
Since Roth the Supreme Court has progressively narrowed the limits of action-
able obscenity.3,31 Lockart and McClure have speculated that the "concept of
obscenity held by most members of the Court is probably hard-core pomography."
33
It is arguable that the speculation was confirmed in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day.3 33 Justice Harlan indicated that for matter to be declared nonmailable by
the Postmaster General as obscene, it must appeal to the prurient interest and must
be patently offensive. Since the magazines, directed at a homosexual audience,
were not patently offensive by contemporary notions of rudimentary decency they
were mailable.33 4
a. Constant or Variable Test? Manual Enterprises represents something of a
triumph for advocates of a constant obscenity test. A magazine for homosexuals
is not adjudged obscene by reference solely to its effect upon its primary audience.
Under such a test cases involving the receipt by scientists of clearly obscene materials
for study purposes could possibly result in a fairly wooden finding of traffic in
obscenity.3 3 5
325 Id. at 486-87.
326 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); People v. Richmond County
News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
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MARQ. L. REv. 57 (1956); Murray, Literature and Censorship, 14 BooKs ON TRIAL 393
(1956); Fischer, "The Harm Good People Do," Harpers, Oct. 1956, p. 14; Murray, "The Bad
Arguments Intelligent Men Make," America, Nov. 3, 1956, p. 120; 59 COLUm. L. REv. 387(1959); Roy, "Catholicism & Protestantism," The New Leader, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 8; Flexner,
"The Man Who Corrupted California," Esquire, March, 1964, p. 82.
328 Roy, supra note 327, at p. 10.
329 Cairns, Paul, and Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws
and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962).
330 Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring Pornography from the Mail, 26 Fop. L.
REv. 70, 91 (1957). The absence of empirical data need not make us "purblind to the decadence
of paganism"; see Elias, Obscenity: The Law, A Dissenting Voice, 15 BAYLOR L. Rav. 1 (1963).
331 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S.
371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355
U.S. 35 (1957).
332 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 5, 60 (1960).
333 370 U.S. 478 (1962). The argument for confirmation rests on the fact that none of
the other justices diagreed with his formula and on the suggestion that a "patently offensive!"
test is virtually indistinguishable from a "hard-core pornography" test.
334 Id. at 486-89.
335 See generally United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
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To be sure, a variable test for obscenity presents its own special problems
centering upon careful delineation of the primary and the peripheral audiences and
including difficult judgments about the nature of the appeal and the impact upon
the primary audience.33 6 But such a test would not be impossible of application
and it would permit the government to include material which is not hard-core
pornography within the category of the constitutionally obscene.3 37 Thus protection
would be afforded the immature and the deviate without impending access to the
general adult public.3s3
b. Identifying the Relevant Community. The Manual Enterprises Court insisted
upon a "national" standard in determining the relevant "community." 339 Justice
Harlan's explanation, that this result was compelled by the existence of a federal
statute,3 40 may lead some state courts to infer the permissibility of employing local
community standards in state actions. In State v. Hudson County News Co.341
the trial court permitted a lay witness to testify that Jersey City had a "very, very
high moral standard as compared to other areas that I have visited."3 42 In affirm-
ing the conviction the superior court oddly reasoned that defendant was not harmed
since "[i]t is to be presumed that the community standards of morality in Hudson
County are the same as those in any other county in the State or Nation."3 43 The
New Jersey Supreme Court found reversible error in permitting the jury to decide
the question based upon local standards.3 44
The problem of the proper community will undoubtedly recur until the day
the Supreme Court speaks. On that day it may very well consider the argument
that a national standard is too parocha1345 and that an exception should be carved
out for "classics" which have survived many "communities."346 The practical diffi-
culties involved in such an extension of the relevant community will militate against
liberalization. For example, "to carve out an exemption for 'old and standard
works' is obviously to invite wide disagreement as to the boundary between the
lawful and criminal: Is Boccaccio or Beaudelaire standard; is Shelley old
enough?"3 4 7
c. The Average Man. Since the decision in Manual Enterprises was based on
grounds other than appeal to prurient interest, the Court never reached the question
of whether the magazine must be found to have appealed to the prurient interest
of the average man or of the average homosexual.3 4 We have observed that the
"patently offensive" test has some resemblance to a constant obscenity concept.3 49
This is so because to apply the test to a variable primary audience is to conduct
336 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 332, at 77-79.
337 Ibid.
338 This would seem to solve the problem raised by Elias, supra note 330, at 3.
339 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962).
340 72 Stat. 962, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
341 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
342 Id. at 233.
343 78 N.J. Super. 327, 188 A.2d 444, 447 (1963).
344 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225, 235 (1963).
345 Bantam Books v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47, 57 (1953). See generally
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 comment (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1957), cited in the Joint Com-
mittee's DRAFTING AN OBSCENITY STATUTz 92-101 (1961).
346 Joint Committee, op. cit. supra note 345, at 98.
347 Ibid.
348 Justice Harlan was joined by Justice Stewart in an opinion which took the position that
it was not necessary to consider "prurient interest" since the matter was not "patently offen-
sive." Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurred in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Brennan pitched on the narrow procedural ground that the Postmaster General had under the
circumstances acted ultra vires the statute in closing the mails to defendant. Mr. Justice Black,
without opinion, noted his concurrence in the result. Mr. Justice Clark dissented. Justices
Frankfurter and White did not sit.
349 Supra text at note 335.
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a futile inquiry into whether the average homosexual is "offended" by material
calculated to pander to his sexual appetites. On the other hand, it is equally useless
to ask the fact-finder if the suspect material appeals to the prurient interest of the
average heterosexual. Accordingly, the emerging test would appear to be to ask
the fact-finder to determine: (1) if the material is patently offensive to the average
person in the community and, if so, (2) whether the material appeals to the prurient
interest of the average member of the primary audience.350
Given the existing confusion about the "average man" it is not at all clear
that the courts are prepared for such a subtle distinction between the functions of
differing average viewers. One court expressed concern about the seeming abdi-
cation of responsibility involved in judicial deference to the hypothetical average
person.35 1 Another court belittled the importance of testimony by literature experts
noting that they were not expert regarding the "average person" with respect to
whom the "average policeman, judge, or general medical practitioner would prob-
ably have come much closer to being an expert. '3 52 On the other hand a New
Jersey court has suggested that "[n]o witness can qualify as an 'average man,'
and that accordingly a lay witness would ordinarily be incompetent to give opinion
testimony.3 53 One lower court has wondered why an appellate court's perception
of the "average person" should be any more competent than the trial court.3 54
Finally, there is the unsettled question of whether the judge or the jury has the
better insight into the heart of the "average person."s
d. Considering the Material as a Whole. It was early anticipated that this part
of the Roth test would be particularly troublesome. To the censorious this require-
ment seemed to be an unnecessary and dangerous concession to the abstract propo-
sition that the artistic whole cannot be infected by some of its parts.350 Moreover
they did not appreciate the veiled suggestion that only prudes or philistines would
object to such an approach to art criticism.357
In the comment to the Model Penal Code an attempt is made to explain this
requirement to the optimal satisfaction of all parties:
However, "consideration as a whole" does not mean that a grossly
pornographic picture is exempt from criminal sanctions merely because it is
sandwiched in between unobjectionable reproductions, that an excessively
bawdy skit is immune because it constitutes only one scene in a musical
review, or that one obscene short story is saved by the propriety of the rest
of the anthology. It does mean that a novel like Ulysses could not be con-
demned on the basis of fifty pages of soliloquy and fantasy by one of the
characters, even assuming these fifty pages standing alone would violate the
law, since this portion of the story is integral with the rest and the total
appeal of the work is not prurient. Obviously this calls for subtle discrimina-
350 Lockhart & McClure have suggested that "hard-core pornography," which necessarily
is repulsive to the average man, can never simultaneously appeal to the average man's prurient
interest and, therefore, logically remains outside the Roth -definition of obscenity. Supra note
332 at 67-68. One critic has responded that Roth "does not require that the matter . . .
actually appeal to the average person; it requires only that the average person decide what
appeal the matter does, in fact, have." Wilson, California's New Obscenity Statute: The Mean-
ing of "Obscene" and the Problem of Scienter, 36 So. CAL: L. Rxv. 513, 523 (1963). After
Manual Enterprises conflict between repulsiveness and prurient appeal is less obvious because
the viewer may regard the material as being "patently offensive," i.e., repulsive, without failing
to notice its studied appeal to the prurient interest of its primary audience.
351 Stengel v. Smith, 236 N.Y.S.2d 569, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
352 State ex rel. Beil v. Mahoning Valley Distributing Agency, 116 Ohio App. 57, 186
N.E.2d 631, 632 (1962).
353 State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225, 233, n.9 (1963).
354 Stengel v. Smith, 236 N.Y.S.2d 569, 578 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
355 Wilson, supra note 350, at 534.
356 See Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20"LAW & CONTEMIP. PROB. 587, 602(1955).
357 Ibid. Elias, supra note 330, at 3.
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tion in deciding what is the unit to be considered "as a whole," what things
are "integrally" related so as to call for an overall judgment.'3 8
Commentators have perceived that difficulties will arise when material is
claimed to be irrelevant, or relevant but unnecessary to the theme.359 Judge Clark
rejected the argument that there was an unnecessary use of "four-letter" words
in Lady Chatterley's Lover, noting that the "passages to which the Postmaster
General takes exception - in bulk only a portion of the book - are subordinate,
but highly useful elements to the development of the author's central purpose."
360
Usually those who argue irrelevancy or lack of necessity have in mind excision
or substitution, not a ban of the whole work. Thus frequently foreign-made movies
will be "doctored" or "cleaned up" for the American viewer. Violations of the
spirit, if not the letter, of this part of the Roth test occur more often in film than
in book censorship.3 61 Thus the rape scene in Virgin Spring was sufficient to justify
a finding that the dominant theme of the film appealed to prurient interest.
362
Some argue that cutting a rape scene from Virgin Spring or deleting the words
"rape" and "contraceptive" from Anatomy of a Murder363 is justified by a balancing
test.'6 4 Others maintain that the "consideration as a whole" test bars such piece-
meal editing. With the advent of Manual Enterprises this latter argument of the
literati may be replaced by the broader libertarian contention that "all regulation
of obscenity" is doomed.
3 6 5
While it is true that the courts heed the "consideration as a whole" test more
faithfully when ruling on the alleged obscenity of books, they tend to apply it in
a mechanical fashion by weighing the number of obscene pages against the number
of unobjectionable pages. Tropic of Cancer has particularly suffered from this kind
of approach.36 6 Of course the trouble with this "bulk" test is that the court is
supposed to be judging the obscenity of a book, not of discrete pages or passages.
"Consideration of the whole" does not mean consideration of each part in a series
of isolated judgments; it does mean consideration of parts in relation to the whole 367
e. The Necessary Intent and Knowledge. The intent or purpose of the author
or creator would not seem to be relevant to the issue of obscenity under either the
"prurient interest" test of Roth or the "patently offensive" test of Manual Enter-
prises. This is because the fact-finder is concerned with the material-as-perceived
and not with the material-as-conceived, with objective effect and not subjective
intention.3 68 Nevertheless, the courts will talk about the "serious purpose" of the
358 Joint Committee, op. cit. supra note 345, at 98-99.
359 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 332, at 91.
360 Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1960).
361 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 342 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), suggests that different stand-
ards may apply to films. For excellent discussion by the Chairman of the Motion Picture Appeal
Board of the City of Chicago see Mulroy, Obscenity, Pornography and Censorship, 49 A.B.A.J.
869 (1963). See also Kauper, Obscenity and Censorship: Protecting the Public Morals, CrwsL
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 52, 74-89 (1962). Part of the problem, according to Pro-
fessor Kauper, lies in the confusion as to whether the states "are limited by the Due Process
Clause or by the First Amendment." Id. at 85.
362 Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 354 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1962).
363 Elias, supra note 330, at 3.
364 Ibid.
365 Mulroy, supra note 361, at 875.
366 E.g., People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 716-17 (1963) in which the
court at n.5 identifies by page number each and every page containing "obscene" passages.
367 Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1960).
368 St. John-Stevas, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 1 (1956) (" 'Obscenity' . . . has no ...
correspondence to a tangible object, being a relative and subjective term, describing the reaction
of the human mind to a certain type of experience."); Contra, Wilson, supra note 350 at 523
(" 'Appeal' here does not refer to the effect or impact on the reader but to a quality in the
matter itself.").
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author3 6 9 or the "reputation" of the publisher 370 Some commentators contribute
to the confusion by suggesting that pornography be identified by a "main purpose
... to stimulate erotic response in the reader."3 71
Similarly, evidence adduced to show that the procurer's purpose or intended
use was of a scientific character is not relevant to the issue of obscenity under
either Roth or Manual Enterprises. Still, courts will fret that unless the obscenity
test include an examination of the subjective intention of the procurer the law
will be saddled with a "constant obscenity test" which will work injustice in
certain well-defined cases.372 There are two answers to this supposed problem,
both of which would leave intact the objective Roth test, as modified by Manual
Enterprises. We have described this test as involving two equally objective inquiries:
(1) as to whether the material patently offends the average person of the com-
munity; and (2) as to whether it appeals to the prurient interest of the primary
audience.3 7 3 Therefore, it can be argued that though the material be patently
offensive, it appeals not to the prurient but to the scientific interest of the average
member of the primary audience. Application of the test in this fashion would
result in a finding that the material is not within the legal definition of obscenity.
Suppose it is rejoined that the scientific community is not the primary audience
(e.g., patently offensive homosexual magazines, intended for a primary audience of
deviates, which are acquired by the Kinsey Institute) 3 74 or that since scientists are
human a prurient appeal is not precluded by a scientific interest? Conceding, for
the sake of argument, that a finding of obscenity would then be required, the
procurer would nevertheless be permitted to plead in justification his special purpose.
This is the position taken by the Model Penal Code37s and it would not be incon-
sistent with the Roth-Manual Enterprises test.
Since Smith v. United States 76 made it clear that scienter on the part of the
accused was required, a series of state court decisions have dealt with the problem.
One court has held that mere possession of pornographic material for one's own
gratification was not a legal wrong.377 An Ohio court has held that a statute making
it a misdemeanor to have possession of an obscene motion picture film, without a
finding of knowledge or scienter on the part of the accused, was unconstitutional3 73
However, that court, in another case decided the same day, was willing to save a
different statute by implying these necessary elements. 3 7  Circumstantial evidence
was sufficient in a case which also cited with approval the Model Penal Codes
presumption against one who disseminates or possesses obscene material in the
course of his business.380
In the comment to the Model Penal Code "the principal objective" of the
proposed obscenity statute is said to be the prevention of "commercial exploitation
of... psychosexual tension."38' Schwartz has observed that these Code provisions
369 Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d 328, 334 (Mass.
1962).
370 'Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 242 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
371 Kronhausen, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 18 (1959).
372 State v. Andrews, 150 Conn. Supp. 92, 186 A.2d 546, 555 (1962).
373 Under this analysis it is clear that an obscenity test, though concerned with effect upon
variable audiences, can nevertheless be objectively applied.
374 This argument presupposes that the primary audience must be the intended audience
and not merely the actual or a derivative audience.
375 Joint Committee, op. cit. supra note 345, at 91.
376 361 U.S. 147 (1959). For a discussion of some of the problems remaining after Smith
see Wilson, supra note 350, at 539-43.
377 State v. Coleman, Ohio Op. 2d, 193 N.E.2d 198 (1963).
378 State v. Warth, 173 Ohio St. 15, 179 N.E.2d 772 (1962).
379 State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
62 (1962).
380 State v. Andrews, 186 A.2d 546, 552 (Conn. 1962). See MODEL PENAL CODE, §
251.4(2).
381 Joint Committee, op. cit. supra note 345, at 95.
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provide a type of regulation that expresses "the moral impulses of the community
m a penal prohibition that is nevertheless pointed at and limited to something else
than sin," namely, a "disapproved form of economic activity.' s82 The government
attorneys on the brief in Roth submitted a chart of "comparative value of different
kinds of speech" based largely upon the purpose of the speaker. "Political speech"
was listed first and "commercial pornography" last.383 There is authority for the
proposition that "we may litter the streets with handbills extolling the most danger-
ous and immoral of philosophies, but not with handbills extolling the most innocuous
of soaps."38s 4 It may be argued that the "commercial exploitation of . . . psycho-
sexual tension," much more than the commercial exploitation of soap, should be sub-
jected to close regulation for no more compelling reason than the instinctive feeling
that such communications are unworthy of unfettered access to the consuming
public.
Although this approach is interesting, there remain unresolved problems. Ini-
tially, there is the significant problem of identification, of separating "commercial
exploitation" from "literary or social exposition." Furthermore, it is not clear how
one would resolve an obscenity prosecution for material disseminated both by an
author, who is trying to express a serious idea, and by a publisher, who is obviously
using the author's work to exploit commercially the reader's psychosexual tension.385
L The Necessary Effect. After Manual Enterprises the legal obscenity test, at
least for federal courts, would appear to require an effect of patent offensiveness
upon the average person of the community and an effect of predominant prurient
interest upon the primary audience. While the "patently offensive" requirement is
the ground advanced by Justice Harlan in an opinion in which only Justice Stewart
joined, the other concurring judges did not object to this significant modification
of Roth. Nor is it clear that these judges would oppose such a pro-libertarian test,
especially when one considers the impetus to the approach provided by the American
Law Institute's definition of obscenity.3s 6
The effect of patent offensiveness describes the invariable reaction of the
average person to so-called "hard-core pornography." Yet Justice Harlan expressly
refused to say that the Court was adopting a hard-core pornography test.38 7 How-
ever, we have it on the authority of Lockhart and McClure that the "concept of
obscenity held by most members of the Court is probably hard-core pornography."38 81
Several states have recently embraced the test under the theory that the Roth-
Alberts test tracks the first amendment limits upon that which can be prohibited
as obscene but speaks not at all concerning the right of a state to exercise its police
power in this area with self-imposed restraint." 9 Accordingly, it becomes important
to understand the meaning of "hard-core pornography" in the context of the
developing case law.
382 Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. Rv. 669, 677(1963).
383 Joint Committee, op. cit. supra note 345, at 99-100.
384 Rodes, The Passing of Nonsectarianism - Some Reflections on the School Prayer Case,
38 NoTRe DAME LAWYER 115, 134 (1963), commenting on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942).
385 Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1962).
386 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10(2), (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957): "A thing is obscene
if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in description or representation of such matters." [Emphasis added.] Mr. Justice
Brennan referred to the Code's definition approvingly in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at
487, n.20. Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises commented that "[the thoughtful studies
of the American Law Institute reflect the same twofold concept of obscenity." 370 U.S. at 485.
387 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962).
388 Supra note 332, at 60.
389 People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961); Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152 (1963).
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Lockhart and McClure cite the Kronhausens as authoritative.39 0 They distin-
guish between erotic realism (protected) and hard-core pornography (subject to
prohibition) based upon the author's "overall intent."39' These guidelines are
provided:
Is the author asking the reader .. . to disregard the plot, to dis-
regard the theme and merely to keep on turning the pages to look for
"dirt for dirt's sake"? Or did he intend to awaken in the reader a desire to
pursue the story because of sobering and provocative thoughts of one nature
or another - including reflections upon sex and sexual relations?392
While there is authority for this "intention" test,393 it should be noted that
the emphasis upon the author's artistic or scientific purpose rather than upon the
reaction of the audience3 94 is strikingly different from the effect-oriented approach
of the Roth-Manual Enterprises decisions.395 The Kronhausens tell us that "the
effect [of erotic realism and of hard-core pornography] are at times identical."3 96
Thus the ascendancy3"r of a "hard-core pornography" test, so understood,39  would
change the existing inquiry significantly.
The "patently offensive" test is really "hard-core pornography" test if hard-
core pornography can be said to exhaust the category of the patently offensive.
Given this understanding of the legal meaning of obscenity, a judge would apparently
be required in every case to make an independent review of the material. The
purpose would be to prevent the jury from finding material to be "patently offen-
sive" although it is not as a matter of law "hard-core pornography." Thus, under
a fully matured hard-core pornography test the jury would still gauge "effects"
but the judge would retain a veto power. However, such a view would diminish
the role of the jury -by upsetting verdicts not clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence - a curious result given the ostensible purpose of discovering "community"
and "average person" standards.3 99
3. Policing the Definition -Shifting Procedures.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his concurring opinion in Manual Enter-
prises, the methods whereby obscenity is condemned are as important as the stand-
ards to use.400 After concluding that the Postmaster General acted ultra vires
because Congress did not authorize the dosing of the mail, Brennan conceded that
he was "greatly influenced by constitutional doubts" but that the case did "not
require a decision as to whether any establishment of administrative censorship
could be constitutional."40' His doubts centered on the "suggestion that Congress
390 Mulroy, supra note 361, at 874.
391 Kronhausen, supra note 371, at 18.
392 Id. at 150.
393 See authorities cited in concurring opinion of Judge Desmond in People v. Richmond
County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 687.
394 Supra text at note 368.
395 And, it may be observed, different from the approach of many moralists and theologians.
1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 688.
396 Kronhausen, supra note 371, at 18.
397 Several states have already limited the meaning of obscenity under their statutes to
"hard-core" pornography. E.g., Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 383 P.2d 152 (1963);
Attorney General v. Tropic of Cancer, 345 Mass. 11, 184 N.E.2d 328 (1962); People v. Rich-
mond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961). But cf. State v. Andrews,
150 Conn. 92, 186 A.2d 546 (1962) ; Monfred v. State, 226 Md.- 812, 173 A.2d 173 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962); State v. Chobot, 12 Wis.2d 110, 106 N.W.2d 286 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 15 (1961).
398 The meaning of "hard-core pornography" in spite of the analysis by the Kronhausens is
not free from conceptual difficulties. See the opinions of Judges Proctor and Jacolbs in State v.
Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225, at 228 and at 235 (1963).
399 See Halsey v. New York Soc. for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219,
220 (1922).
400 370 U.S. 478, 497 (1962).
401 Id. at 499.
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may constitutionally authorize any process other than a fully judicial one."40 2
Two other post office cases of interest were decided within the period under
study. Kahm v. United States40 3 presents the interesting question of whether a
defendant can be convicted for mailing advertisements of a book that is not obscene.
Defendant had lifted the most vivid passages from Peyton Place and other books.
The court held that since defendant had seen to it "that his readers are not sub-
jected to any book as a whole," in finding him guilty there was no need for the
jury to consider the "dominant theme of the material taken as a whole." 44 Since
only the advertisement was under consideration the government was not required
to call witnesses to testify regarding the book. The decision requires the publisher
for his own safety either to mail the whole book or to advertise the contents with
more discrimination. The court's willingness to hold those interested in such com-
mercial exploitation to a higher standard is clearly justifiable.
In United States v. Darnel4" 5 the court held that a private letter written to
a married woman discussing the writer's homosexual relations with her husband
was "at least filthy" if not obscene. 40 6 If the case stands for the proposition that
"filthy" means something other than obscene it creates a needlessly confusing dual
standard.4 0 7 What is more disturbing is the possibility that the law is compensating
the wife for an injury to the marital relation or punishing the writer for the homo-
sexual relations and not for a communication which, if given orally by phone or
face-to-face, would not have been actionable.
Paul and Schwartz have suggested that all determinations of censorship should
be left to the courts.408 The post office should confine itself to the initial investiga-
tion and the recommendation of prosecution to the Justice Department.40 9 Failing
this, they advise that administrative discretion should be more severely limited.410
A beginning would be to require the hearing examiner to take expert testimony
which of all the safeguards "seems the easiest to provide and the least disruptive
of the adjudicative process.1"411
The inherent dangers of casual prior restraint, 412 which motivated these critics
of postal censorship, prompted the Supreme Court in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van41 3 to declare unconstitutional the informal system of censorship conducted by
the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. Justice Brennan
described the Commission as voluntary and nongovernmental, but observed that in
practice it acted with an air of official authority since it would circulate lists of
undesirable books with the thinly veiled threat that the prosecutor would deal with
any book dealer who sold them. The work of the Commission was procedurally
defective in that the publisher or distributor was not entitled to notice and hearing.
Justice Brennan reminded the Rhode Island legislators, whose mandate to the Com-
mission was vague and uninformative, that administrative determinations of ob-
scenity have been upheld only where they have "operated under judicial superin-
tendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination of the validity
of the restraint."
414
Bantam Books now takes its place with Marcus v. Search Warrant415 as a
402 Id. at 519.
403 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1962).
404 Id. at 83.
405 316 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1963) aff'd per curiam.
406 Id. at 814.
407 49 IOWA L. REv. 552, 559 (1964).
408 Paul & Schwartz, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 136-37 (1961).
409 Id. at Part V, Oh. 7.
410 Id. at Part V, Ch. 8.
411 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 664, 684 (1963).
412 E.g., K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, 125 S.E.2d 207, 209
(1962).
413 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
414 Id. at 70.
415 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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warning to those more zealous to suppress and impound than to advise and hear.416
Unfortunately, Mr. Justice Brennan does not explain with sufficient specificity the
requirements for acceptable administrative censorship. 417 The remark that law
enforcement officers may maintain "informal contacts" with suspected violators for
the purpose of giving "legal advice" restores ambiguity to this area of the law.4 8
The danger remains that even advice will restrain "because of its aura of legal
sanction."4 1 9 Finally, the Court's failure to strike down the statute (only the "ac-
tivities" and the "informal system of censorship" are declared unconstitutional)
may serve to encourage other such procedurally inadequate statutes for the ostensible
purpose of "advice."
4. Interpreting the Definition- Shifting Responsibility.
We have noted that a fully matured hard-core pornography test could result
in a shift of effective fact-finding from the jury to the judge. The primary reason
for this is the test's built-in libertarian bias in favor of free circulation except for
the "sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre."420 It may be predicted that
jury verdicts will be rejected for failure to distinguish between pornography and
hard-core pornography, the perverse and the grossly perverse, the offensive and
the patently offensive.
Harlan in his Roth42' and Manual Enterprises22 opinions has provided the
stimulus for an increasing number of courts to announce the inescapable duty of
the trial court judge and of the reviewing court42 3 to decide independently of the
jury the issue of obscenity.424 Harlan maintains that the issue is not merely one of
fact "but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate
kind."42 -5 Dean Joseph O'Meara, on the other hand, has observed that the fact
of obscenity is the kind of fact juries have always decided.4 26 One might suppose
416 United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962); State v. Hudson County News
Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963).
417 Compare William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961),
with City of Atlanta v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 218 Ga. 714, 130 S.E.2d 490 (1963).
418 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963).
419 49 IowA L. REv. 161, 168 (1963).
420 People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 175 N.E.2d 681,
686 (1961).
421 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (1957).
422 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 479-95 (1962).
423 Although Justice Harlan spoke only of the duty of the reviewing court, the extensions to
the trial court judge have been made. The theory would seem to be .that if the question of law in
a mixed fact and law issue is sufficient to be dispositive on review it necessarily requires a
ruling by the judge below. See 12 BUFFALo L. R.xv. 369, 377-78 (1963) where it is argued
that "obscenity is a fact question at the trial level and only becomes a mixed question on
appeal."
424 E.g., State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225, 230 (1963);
People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 118, 192 N.E.2d 713 (1963).
425 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957).
426 Dean O'Meara's spirited defense of final jury determinations in obscenity cases has not
been reduced to a published article. A survey of the scant literature on the subject of thejury's role in obscenity cases reveals the importance to the profession of such an article. This
is especially true in view of the present trend away from effective fact-finding by the jury in
obscenity cases. At one time the function of the jury as triers of the fact of obscenity was
unquestioned. Compare Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 383 P.2d 152 (1963) with People v. Pesky, 254
N.Y. 373, 374, 173 N.E. 227 (1930) wherein the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion
said:
If those charged with the duty to pass judgment upon the facts might
say not unreasonably that the book sold by the defendant was obscene, lewd
or indecent beyond a reasonable doubt (Penal Law, § 1141), we are not
at liberty to substitute our judgment for theirs, or to supersede their func-
tion as the spokesmen of the 'thought and sentiment of the community in
applying to the book complained of the standard of propriety established by
the statute.
A different question would be here if we could say as a matter of law
that the writing is so innocuous as to forbid the submission of its quality
to the triers of facts. We cannot say that here.
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that the question of the insanity of Jack Ruby involves a "fact" at least as consti-
tutionally significant, at least as "sensitive"' and "delicate," as the question of the
obscenity of Pleasure Was My Business.427  Moreover, whatever arguments could
be advanced for the judge's determination of insanity because of the jury's lack
of competence cannot be advanced in obscenity cases which necessarily involve an
inquiry into "community" and "average person" standards.42
In some cases the shift from jury to judge seems to be a by-product of the
statutory nature of the proceeding. Thus in a Kansas in rem proceeding the court
overruled an objection that a statute authorizing destruction of obscene books was
unconstitutional because it did not provide for jury trial. 429 Thus also, in a New
York declaratory judgment action the court ruled that the action could be main-
tained because obscenity presented a special variety of a law issue.4 30 The court
somewhat confusingly suggested that since a fact issue was also present it would
be possible to submit the question of obscenity to an advisory jury.431 In a sub-
sequent New York criminal case language from this declaratory judgment decision
was cited out of context for the broad conclusion that the "obscenity of a particular
book is a question of law. ' 43 2 The court then proceeded to find reversible error
for the trial court's refusal to find the book not obscene as a matter of law.433
Judge Kiley has remarked that the Supreme Court in Manual Enterprises
"had no alternative to justifying the mailing of MANual, Trim and Grecian Guild
Pictorial" given the current state of our community standards.43 4 But the difficulty
with this assessment is that it assumes that "community standards" are the same
in every part of the United States at any given time, that all that was necessary
was for the Supreme Court to look out of its own "windows" to see "what we
were accepting as pleasing entertainment. '1 3 5 In fact the diverse results returned
by juries in obscenity cases indicate the contrary. Lockhart and McClure have
objected to final jury determinations precisely because they tend to apply local
community standards. 43 6 It may be doubted that this objection can be overcome
by resort to increased use of controversial instructions to apply national community
standards or to give weight to this literary expert or to that psychologist because
jurors invariably believe that the "average person in the community" thinks the
way they do.4 7 Thus the supposed desirability of national uniformity of decisions
contributes to the shift from jury to judge, from an unreviewable finding of fact
to a reviewable question of law.43 8
427 Tralins v. Gerstein, 151 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1963).
428 Halsey v. N.Y. Society for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219 (1922)
(Censorship should not be "intrusted to men of one profession, of like education and of similar
surroundings. Far better than we, is a jury drawn from those of varied experiences, engaged
in various occupations, in close touch with the currents of public feeling, fitted to say whether
the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that a book such as this was obscene or in-
decent."); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (1945) (The
test of obscenity is the effect it has in the community on "sex and sexual desire. . . . [l]t
would seem that a jury of the time and place, representing a cross section of the people, both
old and young, should commonly be a suitable arbiter.")
429 State v. A Quantity of Books, 191 Kan. 13, 379 P.2d 254 (1963), prob. juris, noted, 375
U.S. 919 (1963). The Supreme Court may take this opportunity to clarify the proper role
of the jury in obscenity cases.
430 Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d 207, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1962).
431 See excellent discussion of this case in 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 369, 379-83 (1963).
432 People v. Fritch, 38 Misc. 2d 333, 236 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (Onondaga County Ct.).
See critique in 12 BUFFALO L. Rav. 369, 379-83 (1963).
433 Id. at 709.
434 Kiley, "Obscenity and the Supreme Court," The Critic, Oct.-Nov. 1963, p. 46, 48.
435 Ibid.
436 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: the Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 5, 109-10 (1960).
437 Wilson, supra note 350 at 525, 527.
438 This uniformity is said to be required by the first amendment. Thus in State v. Hudson
County News, 41 N.J. 247, 196 A.2d 225, 235 (1963) the court said: "If a publication
comes within the protected area, it cannot be suppressed any place where the First Amend-
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The significance of this trend for religious values in contemporary America
lies in the apparently irreversible character of the judicial precedents which, under
the apprehension of "following" community standards, in fact ultimately form
them. This would seem to be an inevitable result of a jurisprudence which depre-
cates the role of the jury in cases involving outcome-determinative "public atti-
tudes, impulses and aspirations"; for then "the judge is at sea without a compass
on a starless night."4 39
IV. FREE EXERCISE
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT
That there will always be occasions for conflict between the individual's free
exercise of his religious beliefs and the state's interest in the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens is a fact etched deeply in the history of church-state relations.
It is equally true that an added source of inevitable conflict will exist in a pluralistic
society dedicated to the proposition that the state can pass no laws "which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 440 In this Survey
we shall be interested in considering the current state of that conflict with its several
nuances in order to discover its presuppositions and its implications.
Perhaps the most obvious development, and yet for that reason the most
difficult to perceive, is the changing nature of the conflict. The significance of
the free exercise of religion as a constituent principle of American law is intimately
related to the secular history of these several states. It should not be surprising that
"freedom of religion" has meant one thing when our national commitment was
Protestant, another when the influx of late nineteenth century Catholic immigrants
changed the commitment to one more broadly Christian, and yet another when
the articulate Jewish citizenry transformed it to Judaeo-Christian. 44' As each faith
took its place in what Professor Rodes has called the "defining consensus" in Ameri-
can Society442 it tended on the one hand to conform its institutional and liturgical
forms to those consistent with the shared national commitment while at the same
time it increasingly joined in rudimentary ceremonial observances under secular
auspices designed to demonstrate the fraternal union fashioned by the new con-
sensus.
443
It has always been the lot of those religionists outside of the consensus to utilize
with limited success the free exercise clause as a defense against compelled partici-
pation or prejudicial nonparticipation in these observances. Most recently, adherents
of the Jewish faith, laying claim to membership in the defining consensus, have
sought to eradicate "nonsectarian" observances thought to be relics from the days
of Christian commitment.444 Engel v. Vitale, it can be argued, is at once an ac-
ment guarantee is in effect." But the first amendment does not protect material which is obscene
as determined by jurors who will invariably apply local, even personal standards. Accordingly,
the first amendment does not compel uniformity. Of course local censorship based upon prior
restraint collides with the first amendment's national command precisely because the pro-
scribed material, not as yet judicially determined to be obscene, remains protected. For a
general discussion of the first amendment as applied to prior and post restraints see Kauper,
supra note 361. See also the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Desmond in People v. Fritch,
13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 719 (1963): "Of course a jury cannot repeal the First
Amendment but when a jury (as here) makes a finding of obscenity as to material not un-
reasonably deserving that epithet, there tan be no violation of the Constitution."
439 O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 NATURAL L. F. 83, 92 (1960).
440 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
441 Rodes, The Passing of Nonsectarianism - Some Reflections on the School Prayer Case,
38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 115, 126 (1963).
442 Ibid.
443 For a general discussion of free exercise of religion in the United States, together with
a recounting of'the historical background, see Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36
So. CAL. L. Rav. 546 (1963).
444 Pfeffer, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 395 (1953), commenting on Doremus v.
Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950): "Aside from the differences between the
Protestant and Catholic versions of the Lord's Prayer, it would seem that characterizing the
Lord's Prayer as nonsectarian constitutes a cavalier disregard of the conviction of adherents
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knowledgment of their asserted claim upon the consensus and an implicit mandate
to enlarge the ceremonial manifestations of our national commitment to reflect
properly the broadened consensus.4 5 Under this view Engel can be read as vali-
dating the "consensus" credentials of the Jewish faith446 much as Torcaso v. Wat-
kins4 7 can be understood as a similar validation for nontheists. In short, the con-
sensus as defined in theory by the Supreme Court now clearly includes non-Christian,
nontheist religionists. The free exercise of their religion is now legally protected
from discriminatory legislative graces and official rituals attuned to the old national
commitment. Hereafter they will have the problem of implementation and accom-
modation, not the problem of recognition and protection.
This is not to suggest that the problems remaining for those of the Jewish
faith or of a nontheist cult will forthwith be resolved. On the contrary, the after-
math of Brown v. Board of Education448 has made it abundantly clear that a new
de facto consensus cannot be created by judicial fiat. There will be more "school
prayer" litigation by Jews and more "conscientious objector" litigation by non-
theists, both of which will be greeted by accusations of atheism or worse.449
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to minimize the significance of these new
developments in the law. For the Jew and the nontheist it means that the nature
of the conflict to attain free exercise of their religion has changed. The Court has
in effect extended to them de jure recognition as part of the defining consensus.
Hereafter the Sabbatarian can expect a court of law to protect him from an un-
reasonable discrimination and the nontheist conscientious objector can expect
similar fairness in seeking a draft exemption.
We must look elsewhere for the really problematic free exercise cases. These
will not involve government-sponsored ceremony as in the prayer cases nor dogma
as in the conscientious objector cases. Rather they will concern the historic attempts
of religionists outside the de jure as well as the de facto consensus freely to exercise
their religion in the face of inhibiting police regulations. In this category we will
find the now familiar problems of the Muslims, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Amish. Having identified their claims as those of the historic
"outsider," it is necessary to observe that their free exercise litigation may differ
markedly from those of the past. A judiciary, in our day more sensitive to the
rights of minorities4 50 and to the implications of ecumenicism, 451 will probably hear
their grievances with a new sympathy for the alienated. Conformity with the con-
sensus will not be demanded as an implicit precondition for standing or redress:
of the Jewish faith." Pfeffer's position is set out in more detail and is sympathetically analyzed
in Rodes, supra note 441 at 117-18. Some members of the Jewish faith have expressed the
fear that this eradication of nonsectarian government-sponsored prayer may have the undesirable
long-term effect of damaging the "hallowed rituals of this land, that symbolically express our
conviction in the numinous reality of God." Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 34 F.R.D. 29,
54 (1964).
445 In contrast for example to the "consensus" implications of the Sunday Closing Law
Cases of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
446 Pfeffer apparently regards Engel as a complete victory for his own position. See Rodes,
supra note 441 at 117, n. 7, commenting on Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16
RUTGERS L. REV. 735 (1962).
447 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In this case the Court held that a Maryland religious test for
public office, requiring an affirmation of belief in God, was an unconstitutional invasion of
Torcaso's freedom of belief and religion.
448 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
449 For example in conscientious objector cases many draft boards apparently feel that non-
theism is inconsistent with the statutory requirement for "sincerity." Father Conklin thinks
that the requirement of belief in a Supreme Being is a test of "sincerity" and not an unreason-
able one at that. Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso
v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 279 (1963).
450 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1963); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
451 Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MicH. L. REv.
419 (1964).
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that the ostracized Black Muslim be tolerant of whites; that the Christian Scientist
or the Jehovah's Witness, stubbornly committed to another life, be astute to prolong
this one; that the Amish, totally involved in their religion, be willing to settle for
less for their children.452
The dynamism of the free exercise clause in the years ahead will derive from
a new approach by the Supreme Court to the recurring conflict between religious
practices and police regulations. No longer will the operative presupposition be
that those outside the consensus must accommodate religion to regulation. Rather,
under the new dispensation the Court will seek increasingly to accommodate the
state's statute to the church's stricture. Sherbert v. Verner, 53 the most significant
free exercise case decided in the two years since our last Survey, may signal the
start of this new era in church-state relations.45
B. PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE.
1. Welfare Legislation.
In Sherbert v. Verner 55 a Seventh Day Adventist took her claim for unemploy-
ment compensation to the Supreme Court after the courts of South Carolina had
determined that her refusal to work from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday
had made her unavailable for work within the meaning of the unemployment com-
pensation statute.450 The decision below was based on several considerations. 457
The statute, since it did not refer to particular days, was read to require avail-
ability for work on Saturday if required by one's usual trade or occupation.458
Complementing this interpretation was decisional law459 which, in general, stated
the broad principle that one may not attach restrictions or conditions to availability
merely because of one's particular needs or circumstances.460 Thus appellant exer-
cised an uncoerced personal choice of her religion and of her trade or occupation,
which choice had the incidental effect of rendering her unavailable. Nor was there
"good cause" for her termination of employment since her religious commitment
did not arise out of her work and since any supposed risk to her morals did not
derive from the character of the work.4 "
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court and reversing the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, held that an otherwise valid law which has the indirect dis-
criminatory effect of impending the observance of one's religion is invalid absent
a showing of the impossibility of an unobjectionable alternative regulation.462
Braulfteld v. Brown,463 the Sunday Closing Law case, was cited as authority for
this holding.464 Neither can it be said that a state may attach conditions upon
public benefits which operate to inhibit the free exercise of religion,6 5 nor can it be
argued that by the removal of such a discriminatory condition the state is establish-
ing a religion.466 Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion also rejected the
452 1960-61 Church-State Survey, supra note 3, at 710-17.
453 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
454 See comment by Rabbi Gilbert in Tenth Judicial Cricuit Conference, 34 F.R.D. 29, 57
(1964): "[T]he Court, in its last decisions, both in the Murray and Schempp Case and the
South Carolina Sabbatarian Case [Sherbert] has developed ... an exciting new concept, that
of 'wholesome neutrality.'"
455 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
456 S.C. CODE § 68-113 (1952).
457 Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125, S.E.2d 737 (1963).
458 Id. at 742.
459 Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951);
Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946), appeal dismissed,
329 U.S. 827 (1946).
460 Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737, 741-42 (1963).
461 Id. at 743-44.
462 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403-10.
463 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
464 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 403.
465 Id. at 405.
466 Id. at 409.
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argument based upon the establishment clause. He observed that the benefits would
be paid to the woman as an unemployed worker, not as a Seventh Day Adventist,
therefore granting no more benefit to that religion than would result from a salary
paid to a co-religionist as a public employee.467 Mr. Justice Douglas contended that
the position taken by the Court amounted to a retreat from the unfortunate teaching
of Braunfeld "that a majority of a community can, through state action, compel
a minority to observe their particular religious scruples so long as the majority's
rule can be said to perform some valid secular function. ' 468
Mr. Justice Stewart, also concurring, renewed the attack on the "establish-
ment" argument. The legitimate free exercise of religion should not be frustrated
by a "sterile construction of the Establishment Clause."46 9 In the past, Justice
Stewart recalled, the Court has been "insensitive" in its interpretation of the free
exercise clause, witness Braunfeld, and "wooden" in its construction of the estab-
lishment clause, witness Engel.470 After today's decision it should be understood
that the "Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmos-
phere of hospitality and accommodation to individual belief or disbelief."'7
In dissent Mr. Justice Harlan, in an opinion in which Mr. Justice White
joined, returned to the reasoning of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The pur-
pose of the act was to tide people over when work was not available. Clearly
there was "no intent to provide relief for those who for purely personal reasons
were or became unavailable for work." 472 Effectuation of the Court's holding, Jus-
tice Harlan predicted, will create difficulties in the administration of the act on a
case-by-case method which the majority does not appreciate. 473 It would be im-
possible to classify those unemployed because of religious convictions according to
a distinction between "productive" and "nonproductive" religionists, between Tues-
day unavailability and Saturday unavailability.4 74 Mr. Justice Harlan observed
that the holding overrules Braunfeld because, if anything, the secular purpose is
clearer here, the burden upon religion more remote.47 5 Finally, he expressed sub-
stantial agreement with Mr. Justice Stewart insofar as he described the Sabbatarian
exemption as an "accommodation," not a constitutionally compelled carving, which
departed from the Schempp476 principle of "neutrality."4 7  Such a departure, he
felt, was needless here where the burden on religion was remote and the financial
aid to a religion apparent.478 It is submitted that Braunfeld can be distinguished
from Sherbert. In Braunfeld the Court was satisfied that there was no alternative
regulation which would effectuate the secular purpose of the Sunday Closing Law
without indirectly burdening Sabbatarians. 47 9 In Sherbert, on the other hand,
Justice Brennan observed that there had been no showing of the impossibility of
an alternative regulation which would not infringe upon first amendment rights.480
Still, it is necessary to account for the striking difference "in the respective attitudes
with which each Court approached the balancing test." 48' The Sherbert Court
"applied the balancing test only after clearly pointing out that only the most com-
pelling and vital state interest could justify a statute which indirectly infringed
467 Id. at 411-12.
468 Ibid.
469 Id. at 414.
470 Ibid.
471 Id. at 415-16.
472 Id. at 419.
473 Id. at 420-21.
474 Ibid.
475 Id. at 421.
476 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
477 Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. at 422.
478 Id. at 423.
479 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 387, 392 (1963) (Braunfeld not necessarily overruled); 25 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 91, 94 (1963) (Braunfeld not overruled).
480 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
481 28 ALBANY L. R-v. 133, 137 (1964).
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appellant's religion."48 2 All the talk in the opinions s3 about a departure from the
Schempp principle of "neutrality" and about a new spirit of "accommodation" is
at least suggestive of the aforementioned new dynamism of the free exercise clause.484
Similarly, it can be argued that Sherbert puts to rest the "religion-blind" thesis85
propounded by Professor Kurland: "The freedom and separation clause should be
read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a stand-
ard for action or inaction because -these clauses, read together as they should be,
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose
a burden."48 6 Far from being "religion-blind," the Court has shown itself to be
highly sensitive to the needs of a minority religionist occupying a position outside
the consensus.487 If this is neutralism, it is the affirmative kind suggested by Mr.
Justice Stewart, not the negative sort advocated by Professor Kurland.48
Sherbert is perhaps most significant in that it appears to achieve the matura-
tion of the free exercise clause. Consider this pre-Sherbert analysis by a federal dis-
trict court: "While extreme vigilance appears to be the rule in connection with
the 'establishment' clause . . . the recent Sunday Closing Law cases indicate a
much greater willingness on the part of the Court to defer to the wisdom of the
states in matters involving the 'free exercise' clause."489 After Sherbert it cannot
be maintained that the free exercise clause waits upon the secular purpose of legis-
lation490 nor, for that matter, that it is subordinate to the establishment clause.491
2. Public Health.
While Sherbert is a prime example of "judicial" accommodation of legislation
to a religious tenet, it is clear that at times the legislature itself has been even more
willing to accommodate. Witness the "immunities from police regulation" enjoyed
by religious minorities "to which they have thus far been given no constitutional
claim." 49 2 For example, a New Jersey statute provides that parents shall not be
denied the right to treat or provide treatment for an ill child "in accordance with
the religious tenets of any church.1 493 In State v. Perricone'94 the court was con-
fronted with the question of whether this provision was dispositive in an action
482 Id. at 138.
483 E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 415, 421-22.
484 Cf. text accompanying notes 452-54 supra.
485 The apt description was used by Pfeffer in a book review of Kurland's RELIGION AND
THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962). Pfeffer may very well
have "put to rest" Kurland's thesis even before the Sherbert Court. After detailing numerous
situations in which Kurland's absolute would be impractical, Pfeffer concluded wryly: "Per-
haps the reader may want to amuse himself by thinking up other instances in which application
of the Kurland imperative would wreak havoc with existing practices and patterns." 15 STAN.
L. REv. 389, 406 (1963).
486 Kurland, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT
112 (1962).
487 One wonders just how sensitive the Court intends to be toward the minority religionist.
Would a Muslim worker in a slaughterhouse who has religious scruples about slaughtering
animals on Friday come within the Sherbert rationale? Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 420,
n.2. See Rabbi Gilbert's comment about Israel's three Sabbaths: Muslim, Jewish and Christian
- Friday, Saturday and Sunday - in Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 34 F.R.D. 29, 53(1964).
488 Kurland has reconciled the result in Engel v. Vitale with his thesis. Kurland, The
Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying . . .", SUPREME CT. Rzv. 1, 32
(1962). However, it would seem impossible to achieve a similar reconciliation of the result in
Sherbert.
489 Williford v. People, 217 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D.Ca. 1963).
490 Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and
"Free Exercise Clause," 42 TEXAs L. REv. 142, 145 (1963).
491 Id. at 185; see generally Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in Church and State, 13 W. REs.
L. REv. 9, 32 (1961).
492 Rodes, supra note 441 at 127.
493 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (1960).
494 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
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charging Jehovah's Witnesses with neglecting their infant son in refusing to grant
permission for necessary blood transfusions.
Although the child had died, the appellate court did not dismiss the case as
moot. The court discounted the legislature's desire to accommodate the "religious
tenets" of the parents and ruled that the parents had indeed been neglectful.4 5
Therefore, the appointment of a guardian for the purpose of consenting to the
transfusions was a proper application of the common law doctrine of parens
patriae.496 Citing Prince v. Massachusetts497 and Cantwell v. Connecticut,498 the
court said that the religious principle requiring inaction must give way when the
child is in "immediate and present danger." 499 The New York Court of Appeals
has reached a similar result in a recent case involving the meaning of "neglected"
within the terms of the Family Court Act."° The act defines a neglected child
as one who is not adequately supplied with medical or surgical care by its parents. 01
Unlike the New Jersey statute, the Family Court Act appears to contemplate parental
behavior clearly short of criminal neglect and by its terms would seem to justify a
resort to vicarious consent in blood transfusion cases.50 2
It has been suggested that the control over children "for the protection of
their health by the state seems almost limitless."-50 3 Moreover, the cases support
the state's right, even in the absence of an emergency, upon a showing that "the
health, limb, person or future of the child be in jeopardy." 50 4 This result is usually
justified by the principle that while parents may be free to become martyrs them-
selves, they are not equally free in identical circumstances "to make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion."-5 5
However, the argument for disregarding the religious beliefs of the parents becomes
less convincing where the legislature has provided an exemption in deference to
the free exercise clause, or where there is no "emergency" or no imminent danger
to public health.50,
One commentator has remarked that "it is obvious that the [Perricone] court
properly exercised its power, since the treatment offered a substantial benefit to
the child without a significant detriment to his health or longevity." 50 7 This
comment illustrates the dangers in a balancing test, concededly necessary in these
cases, which omits from the data to be weighed a regard for the religious interests
involved. In a proper case these interests may not be exclusively those of the
parents. The salvation or damnation of the infant's soul, quite apart from his
consent, may depend upon the doing of certain things to the body of the infant.
This is the reason why Catholic parents are always anxious to secure an early
baptism of their infant. It may be that, from the point of view of the child's religous
interests, freedom from "blood-eating" is as important to the Jehovah's Witness as
infant baptism is to the Catholic. Thus extreme sensitivity to the gravamen of the
parents' religious objection - violation of a religiously compelled parental duty or
danger to the child's soul - would seem to be essential to an acceptable balancing
test.509 Such an approach would minimize the necessity of passing upon the reason-
ableness of the particular religious tenet.
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While this analysis suggests that the volitional incapacity of the infant may
not be determinative, it is not intended to minimize the importance of consent.
Thus where the parents do not speak with one voice, the state should be free to
order the necessary medical care.509 Thus also, where the subject is an adult, who
in full control of his faculties refuses to consent to a blood transfusion, then it would
seem incumbent upon a court to acquiesce in the individual's decision.51 0 How-
ever, a reverence for human life would seem to require a showing that involuntary
submission to a blood transfusion would be visited with the same grave spiritual
deprivations as voluntary submission, that in either case the subject would violate
a cardinal religious tenet which endangers the soul's salvation.
C. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION.
If the greater sensitivity to the free exercise of religion, as espoused by the
Supreme Court in Sherbert, will require in public health cases a difficult inquiry
into the theological effects of involuntary submission, the reverse is true of con-
scientious objection cases under the Universal Military Training and Service Act.511
In the past the exemption has required a finding of religious training and belief
in a Supreme Being on the theory that Congress would be justified "in refusing to
defer to those individuals who merely invoke their own fallible judgment in oppo-
sition to that of the legislature; [but] less so with respect to those whose refusal to
serve is based upon obedience to a power higher than that exercised by a mortal
Congress. 5 1 2 As we have pointed out in the discussion of the public health cases,
a distinction based upon fear of eternal divine punishment is not unreasonable.
However, in those cases the distinction is advanced as a basis for carving out an
area of protected free exercise, whereas here it is insensitively used to narrow the
exemptions based upon religious belief.
Thus it is not surprising in the wake of the new dynamism of the free exercise
clause, as interpreted by Sherbert51 3 and especially by the Torcaso51 4 religious oath
test case, that there should be expressions of doubt concerning the constitutionality
of the "Supreme Being" limitation.51 5 In United States v. Jakobson510 the court
observed that the policy behind the exemptions was the protection of the free
exercise of religion. Given the teaching of Torcaso, that Congress may not "aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs," 517 the court ruled that Jakobson's religion of horizontal
transcendence to Godness came within the statutory exemption. 518 A few months
later the same court in United States v. Seeger' refused to extend the process of
judicial evisceration of the "Supreme Being" requirement and declared flatly
that the statutory classification was violative of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.5 20
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." But cf., 1960-61
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It may fairly be anticipated that the view taken by the Seeger court will ulti-
mately be adopted by the Supreme Court. Any other result would be inconsistent
with Torcaso2  Father Conklin, writing before the Second Circuit decided the
Seeger appeal, has suggested that elimination of the belief in a "Supreme Being"
requirement would amount to "validation of the atheist's claim to equal recogni-
tion and equal protection," would establish the absolute neutrality of the state,0 and
would cause a "frustrated" Congress to "abolish the conscientious objector provisions
entirely." 522 On the other hand, he has argued that retention of the requirement
can be justified under Congress' war powers as a reasonably objective test of "sin-
cerity" which effectively prevents "shirkers from avoiding their military duties. 5 23
Father Conklin may have had in mind the Kurland "religion-blind" thesis
when he spoke of the "dogma" of "absolute neutrality" triumphing in Torcaso.5 24
However that may be, the Seeger decision is surely not a victory for the "absolute
neutrality" of the secular humanist, nor is it a vindication of Kurland's special kind
of religion-blind indifferentism. Rather the case reveals an acute judicial awareness
of the varieties of religious experience. The court observes that "today, a pervading
commitment to a moral ideal is for many the equivalent of what was historically
considered the response to divine commands.' 25
It is difficult to believe, as Father Conklin suggests, that the "belief in a
Supreme Being" requirement was designed as a test of sincerity. That would be
to attribute to Congress an undeserved naivete. Congress does require in every
case an independent finding of "sincerity" which is never satisfied by a mere affir-
mation of belief in a Supreme Being.52 6 It is not clear why Father Conklin should
object to the enlargement of the exemption category to include nontheists5 27 Such
an expanded category would not be more difficult to administer because the big
problems of administration in the past have centered upon detecting "shirkers"-
the very kind of draftee who would falsely attest to a belief in a Supreme Being.
There is no hard data to support the suggestion that such an enlargement will
weaken our military establishment or will render ineffective the policing of the
"sincerity" requirement. Nor is there any evidence that a politically realistic
Congress will in frustration revoke all draft privileges heretofore granted to a con-
sensus defined by theism.
The ministerial exemption, 52 one of the most controversial in the light of
Torcaso, is far from doomed.5 29 While this exemption will continue to provide
difficulties in administration, 530 Congress is not about to withdraw it, nor will the
Supreme Court declare it unconstitutional unless Congress insists upon a narrowly
theistic construction. In short, it is inaccurate to read Tarcaso and its conscientious
objector progeny as examples of new dogma of "absolute neutrality" 531 which will
"wreak havoc with existing practices and patterns." 53 2
Father Conklin's suggestion that the "Supreme Being" clause could be con-
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strued as a legitimate exercise of the war power538 ignores the objection that the
fifth amendment's due process clause is a bar to an unreasonable classification in
war as in peace. It may be doubted that differentiating between theists and non-
theists could aid the war effort by weeding out the shirker. On the other hand, a
classification distinguishing religious convictions of the theist and the nontheist from
philosophical, political, or economic motivations commends itself as a reasonable
exercise of the war power. It is only the religiously motivated who can plead the
policy behind the first amendment. Thus, a pacifist who can convince the draft
board of his religious motivation may be entitled to an exemption. However, it
does not follow that the religiously motivated pacifist may confuse privilege with
right, may obstruct a civil defense dril5 34 or refuse to pay a portion of his income
tax.
5 35
In a context apart from the state's interest in peace and security under the
war powers, we might expect the Sherbert53 spirit of accommodation to come to
the aid of the conscientious objector. In re Jenison537 presented such a problem.
Mrs. Jenison conscientiously objected to sitting on a jury in judgment on another
human being contrary to the biblical exhortation: "Judge not, so you will not be
judged." The trial court said that jury duty was "analogous to military duty in
time of war" and to sanction disqualification for such reasons would be "to invite
the erosion of every other obligation a citizen owes his community and his coun-
try."' 3 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, then vacated and remanded the case for consideration in the light of
Sherbert.53 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court, on reconsideration, reversed noting
that there had been "an inadequate showing that the State's interest in obtaining
competent jurors requires us to override Relator's right to the free exercise of her
religion.' 5
40
Quite apart from the practical fact that compelled jury service in such a case
would have a divisive and demoralizing influence on the other jurors,41 and apart
from the historical fact that such exemptions have been freely granted in the
past,542 the analogy to military service is far afield. The security of the nation is
not threatened by Mrs. Jenison's religious scruple. Nor is it quite correct to describe
the problem as involving an overriding interest in the free exercise of religion.5 v
Actually, both the state's interest in a fair trial and the individual's interest in reli-
gious freedom are best served by accommodating the legal duty to the moral
obligation.
D. PRaSONERs" FREuoM TO PRACTICE RELIGION.
The most significant cases in this area involve the complaints of Black Muslim
prisoners regarding alleged interferences by prison officials with their exercise of
religion. Preliminarily, three questions arise which trouble the court: (1) Is Black
Muslimism to be recognized as a "religion"? (2) If so, which of its activities entitled
to protection under the first amendment survive the prison setting? (3) Finally,
which determinations of prison officials should be reviewable and what findings of
fact should be required?
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In Williford v. People of California 5 44 a federal district court held that the
State of California had the right to prohibit the exercise of the Black Muslim religion
in the state prison pursuant to the maintenance of peace and order in the prison.
The court noted that there had been an administrative determination that Black
Muslimism was not a religion because their tenets of black supremacy, segregation
and violent revolution deviated from true Islamic teachings., 4 In acquiescing in
this finding, the court explained that "the recent Sunday Closing Law cases indicate
a much greater willingness on the part of the [Supreme] Court to defer to the
wisdom of the states in matters involving the 'free exercise' clause.1 546 Further,
it was said that the point was not crucial since even if Black Muslimism could be
classified as a religion its activities could be prohibited for the sake of prison dis-
cipline.5 47 Total prohibition would be "substantially easier of enforcement" especially
since a policy of separate investigations would lead to "continual harassment of the
prison authorities by the Muslims." 48
The position taken by the Williford court can be contrasted with that assumed
in Fulwood v. Clemmer.54 9 In that case the court said that Black Muslimism is
a religion entitled to equal treatment and absolute freedom of religious belief. "Nor
is it the function of the court to consider the merits or fallacies of a religion or to
praise or condemn it, however excellent or fanatical or preposterous it may be."550
The Fulwood court would seem to be authority for the proposition that a mere
belief in a God is sufficient to support a finding of "religion." 55 1
A realistic evaluation of these cases must take notice of underlying factors
which make a policy of accommodation to free exercise extremely difficult. The
large proportion of Negroes in a prison may heighten the danger of a large-scale
race riot. Black Muslimism is a target552 and a breeding ground553 for prejudice.
Therefore, given a significant number of Negroes in a prison, a tightly organized
Muslim group will probably contribute to the potential for racial conflict. Finally,
the fear of the Williford court that recognition would mean continual harassment
of the prison authorities is reasonable in that the Muslims will undoubtedly utilize
court victories over the white administrators to proselyte other inmates.
In the light of these facts it can be maintained "that any breach of discipline
presents a 'clear and present danger' justifying severe repression" of the rights of
speech, religion andi assembly.5 54 However, the possibility that the activities of the
Black Muslim will cause a "clear and present danger" does not justify repression
or nonrecognition as a matter of policy even in the absence of a breach of dis-
cipline. Nor can any decisions of the Supreme Court justify a separate definition
of religion for the purpose of making the administration of our prison system more
efficient.555 In this connection Fulwood's liberal definition of religion is more in
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accord with Supreme Court pronouncements than is the decision in Willi-
ford. 56 Conceding the necessity for recognition of Black Muslimism as a reli-
gion, 7 some attempt to distinguish between activities is desirable.555 It has been
suggested that even private and contemplative activities may present serious dis-
cipline problems requiring broad proscription. 5 9 However, it is not clear that
reading a Muslim newspaper or even a Black Muslim version of the Koran could
amount to a clear and present danger. In regard to impassioned sermons, the
common law test of inciting to riot would seem to suffice as a constant check upon
the more zealous.560 Finally, the importance of the religious interests involved
and the constant possibility of prejudice would seem to require a factual founda-
tion reviewable by the courts in every condemnation of a religious practice.58'
E. SUMMARY.
The free exercise cases in the period under study did not involve any notable
clerical privilege cases, nor was there much litigation involving compulsory edu-
cation5 2 or religious peculiarities.5 3 There were some unusual cases which are
difficult to categorize. In Carr v. St. John's University56 4 Catholic students were
dismissed from the university for participating in a civil marriage which allegedly
violated the promulgated requirement to conform to the ideals of Christian edu-
cation.5 5 In holding that the action was within the unreviewable discretion of the
university the court in effect decided the issue upon a fairly narrow but important
procedural ground. 68 If the gist of the complaint was interference -by the university
with the free exercise of complainants' Catholic religion it would appear that they
would have the impossible burden of showing that the condemned activity was
in accord with the tenets of that religion.
In Sheldon v. Fannin5 6 7 the free exercise of religion justified the refusal of the
pupils to stand for the national anthem.56 s Sheldon can perhaps best be explained
as part of the new willingness of the courts to utilize the free exercise clause to
accommodate statute or agency regulation to freedom of religion. In the earlier
case of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,569 where the compulsory
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was held unconstitutional as applied to a
Jehovah's Witness, the Supreme Court apparently felt that the free exercise clause
was an inadequate ground for their decision. Instead the "relief there afforded"
was on the basis of free speech, not freedom of religion.5 ° Twenty years after
Barnette a fast maturing free exercise clause is thought equal to the task in the
Black Muslims' claim to the status of a legitimate religion appears to have been rejected only in
the prisons."
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Sheldon case. In the past two years the most significant contribution to that
maturation process has been the startling decision in Sherbert v. Verner- a deci-
sion which suggests the growing importance of the free exercise clause in broad
areas of American life. Of course it will take time before we can confidently meas-
ure in these pages the length of the shadow cast by Sherbert.5 71  Still, for the
present at least, we can enjoy the warm sun of a brave new world visualized by
some Sherbert commentators 572 in which the establishment clause no longer clouds
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